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INTRODUCTION
An employee, whose husband regularly beat her and her five
children, informed her supervisor of her experience and requested
time off.1 She used a little over a week of paid leave to move her chil-
dren to safe housing, consult with police, assist in her husband’s
criminal prosecution, and work with the county to obtain other
support, including transitional housing, counseling and health ser-
vices, and legal assistance.2 A month after she returned to work, her
employer demoted her and two months later, terminated her em-
ployment purportedly for falsifying payroll records.3 Assuming that
the employer actually terminated the employee for taking time off
to address the impact of her husband’s violence, many courts across
this nation would not provide this at-will employee with any remedy
against her employer.4 An October 2008 decision from the Washington
Supreme Court, however, may spark a change in how courts address
these cases.5
In Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, the Washington Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that employment terminations such as
1. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 130 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
2. Id. at 130-31.
3. Id. at 131.
4. See infra Parts IV.B-C (discussing states with limited to no recognition of the public-
policy exception to at-will employment).
5. Domestic violence is a pattern of physical violence, coercion, threats, intimidation
isolation, and emotional, sexual, or economic abuse used to control an intimate partner,
child, or other family or household member. JULIE GOLDSCHEID & ROBIN RUNGE,
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 2 (2009). Con-
sistent with the definitions used by the U.S. Department of Justice, domestic violence
is a term that includes both intimate partner violence and violence between other family
members. SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, (Dec. 9, 2007), http://bjs
.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf. Intimate partner violence occurs between “current
or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends, including same-sex relationships.” Id. Because
much of the research on the impact of violence on employment and the workplace is specific
to intimate partner violence, the cited statistics focus on this relationship. But certainly,
as the Danny case illustrates, child abuse and other forms of domestic violence also impact
employment. These forms of domestic violence should therefore be included in any work-
place protections. Danny, 193 P.3d at 130, 135.
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this one implicate the state’s “clear mandate of public policy of pro-
tecting domestic violence survivors and their families and holding
abusers accountable.” 6 It ultimately applied the state’s policy to
allow “employees to do what they must to prevent domestic violence,
without fear of losing their economic independence.” 7 This decision,
the first of its kind from a state supreme court,8 has great potential
to influence other state courts to recognize a similar common-law
claim and to curb the wrongful discharge of many employees.
This article builds on earlier research advocating for a public-
policy exception in this context,9 particularly in light of the recent
Washington Supreme Court decision in Danny and the expansion of
state employment laws that reflect the growing recognition of the
public benefit of providing some economic stability to those experi-
encing domestic violence.10 The Danny decision provides a blueprint
for other states to follow. It does not answer all the thorny questions
regarding what employees must prove to establish a wrongful dis-
charge claim and what defenses employers may have,11 but it clarifies
that the state’s long-term commitment to addressing this societal
issue creates a public policy that applies in the employment arena
as well.12 States should look to the Washington decision and recognize
a public policy in this context.
To evaluate the need for and likelihood of other state courts’ re-
ceptivity to a Danny-like policy, this article simultaneously considers
three variables: 1) the states’ approaches to the public-policy excep-
tion, generally; 2) their statutory recognition of the relationship
6. Danny, 193 P.3d at 141.
7. Id.
8. Before Danny, few courts recognized a similar public policy and other reported
decisions on this issue rejected public-policy claims. See infra Part III.A (discussing cases
leading up to Danny, none out of state supreme courts).
9. See Sandra S. Park, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a “Public
Policy” Exception to Employment-At-Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 121, 124 (2003) (arguing that those who are subject to intimate partner abuse
and are fired as a result of its effects should be able to invoke the public-policy exception
to the employment-at-will rule).
10. Several states have enacted workplace legislation. See Deborah A. Widiss,
Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State Legislation and the Need
for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 698-718 (2008) (discussing laws
created to address the workplace effects of domestic violence); see also infra Part III.B
(discussing state statutes that protect domestic violence victims in the workplace).
11. See infra Part III.A.5 (describing Danny’s holding as limited to the public-policy
element of the wrongful discharge claim). Similarly, this article focuses solely on the rec-
ognition of the public policy and does not address employer defenses or other questions
this cause of action will raise. Because of the great variability in state approaches to this
exception to at-will employment, such an analysis would require another fifty-state survey
and thus, goes beyond the scope of this article.
12. Danny, 193 P.3d at 138.
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between domestic violence and employment, specifically; and 3) the
extent to which these statutes either support or preclude a common-
law remedy for employees based on the particular statutory remedies
provided and the extent of the courts’ legislative deference. This analy-
sis suggests that at least four states and the District of Columbia
would be quite receptive to a broad public policy supporting the eco-
nomic stability of employees experiencing domestic violence.13 Six
other states likely would recognize a public policy at least in the con-
text of an employee who has sought judicial protection from the abuse,
and at least thirteen more in the context of employees who testified or
otherwise assisted with the prosecution of their batterers.14 In over
half of these states, recognition of the public-policy exception is not
only likely, but necessary to implement statutory policies intended to
assist these employees who otherwise fail to specify a cause of action.15
This analysis serves several purposes: to inform employers and
employees of their respective rights and responsibilities; to encourage
state courts to use their power to expand the common-law protections
to reach terminations related to domestic violence; and to further in-
form the current state and national debate on the need for statutory
reform to provide greater, and more consistent, financial stability to
these employees.16 The public-policy exception may currently be the
13. Employees in three additional states (Hawaii, Illinois and Oregon) have strong
statutory claims, but such statutes would preclude most common-law wrongful discharge
claims. See infra Part IV.A.3.c (discussing those states that would be receptive to a Danny-
like policy).
14. Id. (analyzing the likelihood of the states recognizing a form of the public-policy
exception for domestic violence victims).
15. Id. (explaining why the public-policy exception is critical to implementing the
various states’ existing statutes).
16. Scholars and corporate leaders have advocated for laws and policies to address this
societal issue for some time. E.g., Maria Amelia Calaf, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII,
Domestic Violence, and Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW & INEQ. 167, 168 (2003) (“Title
VII provides a viable means by which domestic violence victims can challenge unlawful
discrimination in the workplace and establishes disparate impact as the best alternative
for disputing discriminatory practices.”); Jane A. Randel & Kimberly K. Wells, Corporate
Approaches to Reducing Intimate Partner Violence Through Workplace Initiatives, 3
CLINICS OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 821, 829-32 (2003) (discussing how employers assist
and educate employees on ways to reduce domestic violence through workplace programs).
Scholars continue to advocate for a more comprehensive and effective employment-law
approach. Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence & Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex
Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 113-14 (2008) (advocating for an
interpretation of Title VII that would require employers to engage in a good-faith
negotiation with employees experiencing domestic violence to determine whether any
modest workplace accommodation could be made to “promote safety in the workplace and
maintain valued employees’ economic and physical security.”); Marcy L. Karin, Changing
Federal Statutory Proposals to Address Domestic Violence at Work: Creating a Societal
Response by Making Business Part of the Solution, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 377, 397-418, 428
(2009) (calling for additions to federal statutory proposals that would address employers’
concerns by “transform[ing] the current individual-focused response into a legislative
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only route for many employees seeking relief from their employer’s
conduct. Because the claim is so limited and unpredictable in most
states, however, a statutory claim would be preferable. In the mean-
time, it may be in the judiciary’s hands to strengthen the national
consensus that employees experiencing violence in their homes should
not also be mistreated in the workplace. With Danny as their guide,
state courts should begin to develop this public policy exception.
I. WHAT’S EMPLOYMENT LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?
There is growing recognition that domestic violence impacts
society well beyond the walls of its victims’ homes, often impacting
workplaces.17 The violence may follow the victim-employee to work,
as many batterers seek to sabotage employment in an attempt to ex-
pand their realm of control and make the victims more dependent.18
For those employees who attempt to leave abusive relationships, their
former partners may seek them out at work because of the predict-
ability of that location.19 A current victim’s productivity may thus
suffer because of workplace harassment or stalking, or because of
the stress and distraction the abuse at home causes.20 Victims may
vehicle that recognizes and respects the roles and responsibilities of a variety of
stakeholders”); Widiss, supra note 10, at 718 (advocating for reframing the “patchwork
of protections” state laws offer to further the “public strategy of combating domestic
violence, rather than as protections or benefits for individual victims or individual
employers”) .
17. In a 2007 survey of over 500 employees working at Fortune 1,500 companies, 26%
of the women and 8% of the men self-identified as victims of domestic violence. NAT’L CTR.
ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, CORPORATE LEADERS & AMERICA’S WORKFORCE ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 16 (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.ncdsv
.org/images/Corporate%20Leaders%20and%20America’s%20Workforce%20on%20DV
%20Summary_9-25-07.pdf. In another study of 2,373 employees across three midsized orga-
nizations (an insurance provider, a university, and a transportation company), 10.3% of
the employees had experienced domestic violence in the last twelve months, and between
double and triple that amount had experienced such violence in their lifetime. Carol Reeves
& Anne O’Leary-Kelly, The Effects and Costs of Intimate Partner Violence for Work
Organizations, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 327, 327, 330, 335-36 (2007). A recent,
small-scale study of supervisors in city government and small business settings revealed
that over half had encountered domestic violence issues among their employees in the past
five years and fifteen percent reported encountering such issues “many times” in the
past year. N. Glass et al., Developing a Computer-based Training Intervention for Work
Supervisors to Respond to Intimate Partner Violence 11 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (reporting results from fifty-three participants in computer-based training
pilot program).
18. Anne O’Leary-Kelly et al., Coming into the Light: Intimate Partner Violence and
Its Effects at Work, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 57, 59 (2008). For example, batterers may
interfere with their partners’ ability to get to work or use threats that cause them to leave
work. GOLDSCHEID & RUNGE, supra note 5, at 3.
19. O’Leary-Kelly, supra note 18, at 59.
20. T.K. Logan et al., Partner Stalking and Implications for Women’s Employment,
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also miss work in an attempt to address its effects, recovering from or
seeking medical assistance for injuries, participating in counseling,
finding new housing, developing safety plans with a victim advocate,
or obtaining legal advice and attending court proceedings.21 Many
individuals report experiencing trouble at work22 or losing their jobs
because of domestic violence.23 For businesses, the costs, at least in
terms of the victims’ productivity losses and health care expenses, has
been estimated at $5.8 billion annually.24
The workplace impact is not limited to the victims’ experiences.
Co-workers also suffer consequences, including increased stress and
distraction because of their perception of the abuse and an increased
workload due to the victims’ decreased productivity.25 Perpetrators
may harass or threaten co-workers directly.26 In extreme cases, though
relatively uncommon, perpetrators may even assault co-workers.27
Like the victims, the perpetrators themselves are often less produc-
tive employees.28
22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 268, 285 (2007).
21. Karin, supra note 16, at 378, 393.
22. Id. at 378 (citing WOMEN’S BUREAU, DEP’T OF LABOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
WORKPLACE ISSUE 1 (1996); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?: Is Termin-
ation the Solution When Domestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
275, 287 (2006) (internal citation omitted)).
23. Karin, supra note 16, at 383 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS
7-9, 18-19 (1998)).
24. Widiss, supra note 10, at 679 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION &
CONTROL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
pdf/IPVBook-a.pdf).
25. CHRISTINE LINDQUIST ET AL., INVENTORY OF WORKPLACE INTERVENTIONS DESIGNED
TO PREVENT INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE § 1.1.3 (May 4, 2006), http://www.caepv.org
/membercenter/files/Inventory%20of%20Workplace%20Interventions%20Designed%20to
%20Prevent%20IPV%20%28May%202006%29.pdf.
26. CHRISTOPHER BLODGETT & JENNIFER STAPLETON, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:
IT’S A WORKPLACE ISSUE! RESEARCH REPORT 19-20 (2005), http://www.peaceatwork.org
/resources/DVImpactonWorkplace-SpokaneStudy-2005.pdf (study out of Spokane, Wash-
ington finding that co-workers or supervisors were involved in 20% of the reported work-
place incidents).
27. Id. at 23-24.
28. Although less work has been done to measure the impact that perpetrators have
on their own workplaces, several recent studies support decreased productivity. Emily F.
Rothman & Phaedra S. Corso, Propensity for Intimate Partner Abuse and Workplace
Productivity: Why Employers Should Care, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1054, 1063
(2008) (finding in a small sample of employees that “male employees with a greater pro-
pensity for partner-abusive behavior were less productive than male employees with a
lesser propensity for partner abuse”). Two small-scale studies of men in batterer interven-
tion programs found that they often missed work or had difficulty concentrating at work
because of the violence. Id. at 1055 (citing findings from two 2004 studies in Maine and
Massachusetts). Many perpetrators also admit to using company telephones and vehicles
to stalk or harass their partners. Emily F. Rothman & Melissa J. Perry, Intimate Partner
Abuse Perpetrated by Employees, 9 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 238, 244 (2004).
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Collectively, employers could substantially impact the lives of
those who experience domestic violence and, as a consequence, reduce
the frequency and severity of the harm in our society. Not only does
employment provide some level of financial independence that may
facilitate separation from the abuse,29 but it also provides a sense of
control and psychological reassurance to victims “that they are capable
of providing for themselves and their children.” 30 Employment pro-
vides other non-economic benefits to domestic violence victims, includ-
ing physical safety and social connectedness.31 The workplace also
can serve as an effective vehicle for disseminating information about
available resources, including employee assistance programs and local
and national domestic abuse and batterer intervention programs.32
Employers can train employees to recognize early warning signs of
domestic abuse and to intervene if the employee wants protection or
other assistance to reduce, or even prevent, future violence.33
Many companies recognize the benefits of proactively address-
ing the impact of domestic violence in the workplace.34 Notwith-
standing the great need for such strategies, and the many resources
available to employers who choose to implement them, many em-
ployers still have not implemented domestic-violence-specific policies
or programs.35 Instead of supporting their employees, many employers
29. Widiss, supra note 10, at 680; see also Emily F. Rothman et al., How Employment
Helps Female Victims of Intimate Partner Violence: A Qualitative Study, 12 J.
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 136, 142 (2007) (discussing why employment is helpful
to those struggling with the effects of partner violence and abuse).
30. Rothman et al., supra note 29, at 138.
31. Id. at 138-40.
32. See LINDQUIST, supra note 25, § 1.2 (noting the programs employers can implement
in order to educate employees and reduce domestic violence).
33. See id. § 3.2 (discussing IPV prevention programs at twenty-six companies directed
at employees).
34. See GOLDSCHEID & RUNGE, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing how employers are
addressing domestic violence); LINDQUIST, supra note 25, § 1.2 (noting employers’ reasons
for developing IPV prevention programs). For example, the Corporate Alliance to End
Partner Violence, founded in 1995 by business leaders who view the workplace as an
effective vehicle for combating domestic violence, has dozens of corporate members who
“exchange information, collaborate on projects, and use their influence to instigate change.”
Our Purpose, CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE, http://www.caepv.org
/about/ purpose.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). Employers who encourage employees to
report their experiences can work individually with the employees to meet their specific
needs. While some employees may need time off to address the violence, like the employee
in the Danny case, others may benefit from important, but low-cost, accommodations,
such as telephone and voicemail monitoring, a new telephone number, a new work station,
security escorts, and shift adjustments. Goldscheid, supra note 16, at 120; see also LEGAL
MOMENTUM, SAFETY PLANNING IN THE WORKPLACE: PROTECTING YOURSELF AND YOUR JOB
1-2 (2001), http://www.legalmomentum .org/assets/pdfs/safety-planning.pdf (discussing how
victims of domestic violence can protect themselves and their jobs).
35. A recent survey of corporate executives further reveals this disconnect: “Although
nearly 2 in 3 corporate executives (63%) say that domestic violence is a major problem in
our society and 55% cite its harmful impact on productivity in their companies . . . ,” only
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either fail to recognize what is impacting their employees’ work or
choose not to see it because they consider domestic violence a “private”
matter.36 It may be easier to just terminate the employment based
on the employee’s conduct—for example, frequent absences or late
arrivals—and ignore the underlying cause. Employers also may fear
the alternative—that if they maintain the employee, they might
expose others to harm.37 While employee productivity and workplace
safety may be legitimate employer concerns in certain situations, they
are not the rule, and they should not be used reflexively to terminate
employment without considering the specific circumstances.38 Laws
and policies should instead encourage employers to work with their
employees to preserve their financial stability to the extent possible.
II. THE PUBLIC-POLICY EXCEPTION TO AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
Although many states have begun to address this issue through
specific workplace legislation,39 many employers who terminate em-
ployees for reasons related to domestic violence currently face lim-
ited liability because of the doctrine of at-will employment.40 Not
13% say that their companies should address domestic violence. CORPORATE LEADERS ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Workplace Statistics, (2010), http://www.caepv.org/getinfo/facts_stats
.php?factsec=3 (citing CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 34)
(additional survey results on file with author). According to a 2005 Survey of Workplace
Violence Prevention, 29.1% of businesses have policies addressing workplace violence gen-
erally, and less than half of those address domestic violence specifically. Only 4% of busi-
nesses conduct training on how to respond to issues of domestic violence. Press Release,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Survey of Workplace Violence, 15, 17
(Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://stats.bla.gov/iif/oschwc/osnr0026.pdf. This is consistent
with recent research from the employees’ perspective; although many victims of domestic
abuse report seeking assistance from their supervisors, they also report receiving limited
assistance. Glass et al., supra note 17, at 5-6. On the other hand, perpetrators report ex-
periencing support for enrollment in batterer treatment programs and receiving time off
from work for court dates. Id. at 6.
36. Randel & Wells, supra note 16, at 834.
37. See John E. Matejkovic, Which Suit Would You Like? The Employer’s Dilemma
in Dealing with Domestic Violence, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 309, 313 (2004) (discussing tort-
based claims employers may face); Porter, supra note 22, at 279 (discussing a hypo-
thetical where a hospital was afraid of violence spilling over into the workplace if it still
employed a domestic violence victim).
38. With respect to workplace safety, the risks are often overstated: “[T]he constant
refrain that domestic violence may lead to workplace violence, especially when combined
with the widely-held tendency to blame victims for violence, distorts the overall picture
and may contribute to the frequency with which victims are fired.” Widiss, supra note 10,
at 686. Even in extreme cases of workplace violence, courts frequently do not find the harm
foreseeable and, thus, do not hold the employer liable. Matejkovic, supra note 37, at 315-24
(summarizing several case examples).
39. Widiss, supra note 10, at 698-716 (summarizing current legislation); infra Part III.B.
40. Park, supra note 9, at 124-25. All states but Montana recognize at-will employment.
Id. at 129. While some employer conduct may be prohibited by other statutes, many
employees remain without a remedy when abuse leads to negative employment
2010] PROTECTING ECONOMIC STABILITY 95
withstanding the myriad statutory,41 and common-law exceptions to
the at-will presumption,42 most agree that the general rule contin-
ues to reign: employers and employees may terminate the employ-
ment relationship at any time for any reason.43 The most frequently
used exception to at-will employment, a wrongful discharge claim
that alleges the termination violated public policy,44 seeks to bal-
ance “the employer’s interest in operating a business efficiently and
profitably, the employee’s interest in earning a livelihood, and soci-
ety’s interest in seeing its public policies carried out.” 45
A. Public-Policy Element
States that recognize this exception require the employee to
demonstrate a substantial and clearly-defined public policy that the
consequences. Jessie Bode Brown, The Costs of Domestic Violence in the Employment
Arena: A Call for Legal Reform and Community-Based Education Initiatives, 16 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1, 38-43 (2008) (examining proposed and current laws that protect domestic
violence victims at work); Goldscheid, supra note 16, at 84-104 (explaining that current
application of Title VII fails to address the problem); Nina W. Tarr, Employment and
Economic Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 371, 391-
409 (2007) (summarizing and critiquing laws currently available to domestic violence
victims); Widiss, supra note 10, at 684-85 (“[V]ictims of domestic violence who disclose
their situation[s] to their employers may be fired with relative impunity.”).
41. Such statutory limitations include state and federal employment discrimination
laws, labor protections, and laws protecting employees who report their employers’ criminal
behavior. See Kenneth R. Swift, The Public Policy Exception to Employment At-Will: Time
to Retire a Noble Warrior?, 61 MERCER L. REV. 551, 552-65 (2010) (discussing both state
and federal statutory exceptions to at-will employment).
42. In addition to the public-policy exception, many states recognize an implied contract
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as exceptions to at-will employment.
See Mark E. Brossman, Laurie C. Malkin & Rosemarie M. Coppola, Beyond the Implied
Contract: The Public Policy Exception, the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, and Other Limitations on an Employer’s Discretion in the At-Will Setting, 651
PLI/LIT. 7, 65-78 (2001) (examining the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
context of at-will employment).
43. Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right
of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 73 (2000) (“The employer’s divine right to dis-
miss at any time, for any reason, and without notice has survived with vigor.”). Professor
Summers concluded that the common-law exceptions “have been so grudgingly applied
by most courts, that they are little more than paper shields against arbitrary employer
actions.” Id. at 77. Others conclude that the general rule continues to “[s]wallow the[ e]x-
ceptions.” Joseph E. Slater, The “American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53 (2007).
44. Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 (2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1
full.pdf.
45. Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981). In the mid-
twentieth century, employment began to shift toward recognizing the “interdependence
of individuals, and particularly the dependence of employees on employers and the con-
comitant power of employers to abuse that power . . . .” Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-
at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 653, 657 (2000) (citation
omitted). It is out of this recognition that the public-policy exception grew. Id. at 659-61.
96 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:087
termination at least implicated, if not directly violated.46 States artic-
ulate the other elements of the claim in various ways. For example,
some states require the plaintiff to establish a substantial public policy
and that the “discharge was motivated by an unlawful factor contra-
vening that policy.” 47 In this case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to establish that “the same result would have occurred
even in the absence of the unlawful motive.” 48 A few jurisdictions,
Washington for example, spell out four elements that a plaintiff
must establish:
(1) ‘The existence of a clear public policy (the clarity element);’
(2) ‘that discouraging the conduct in which [she] engaged would
jeopardize the public policy (the jeopardy element);’ (3) ‘that the
public-policy-linked conduct caused the dismissal (the causation
element);’ and (4) [that  the employer] . . . must not be able to
offer an overriding justification for the dismissal (the absence of
justification element).’ 49
Others require a showing that a “clear and substantial public policy”
exists, “the employee’s conduct brought the policy into play,” and
“the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are
causally connected.” 50
Characterized as the “Achilles heel” of a retaliatory discharge
claim,51 the determination of what constitutes a public policy also
varies considerably among states.52 The Illinois Supreme Court ex-
plained that matters that may be recognized as retaliatory discharge
are those that “strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties,
and responsibilities.” 53 The Vermont Supreme Court defines public
policy as “the community common sense and common conscience,
extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals,
public health, public safety, public welfare, and the like. It is that gen-
46. Muhl, supra note 44, at 4.
47. Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 828-29 (W.Va. 1996).
48. Id. at 829.
49. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 131 (Wash. 2008) (en banc)
(quoting Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996)). The test is
attributed to the well-known work of Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Swift, supra note
41, at 567. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where
Does Employer Self-Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 398-99 (1989) (describing the four-
part test).
50. Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998).
51. Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981).
52. Often, whether the plaintiff has articulated a cognizable public policy is a question
of law for the courts. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Iowa
2000) (citation omitted). At least one jurisdiction classifies this element as one of fact for
the jury. Cilley v. N.H. Ball Bearings, 514 A.2d 818, 821 (N.H. 1981) (citation omitted).
53. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79.
2010] PROTECTING ECONOMIC STABILITY 97
eral and well-settled public opinion relating to man’s plain, palpable
duty to his fellow men.” 54
All states clarify that the policy implicated by the termination
must primarily benefit the public, as opposed to serving the individ-
ual’s personal interest.55 States also recognize that the policy must
be “sufficiently concrete” 56 and “so widely regarded as to be evident
to employers and employees alike.” 57 What constitutes a public policy
continues to evolve, but many states recognize public-policy violations
when employees are terminated for refusing to violate laws, perform-
ing public obligations, exercising legal rights or privileges, or report-
ing employers’ criminal activity to public authority.58 Some of the most
common wrongful-discharge claims include terminations for serving
on a jury,59 responding to a subpoena,60 filing a workers’ compensation
claim,61 and refusing to commit an illegal act.62
B. Sources of Public Policy
States also turn to different sources for statements of public
policy. Some states broadly define the sources to include not only
the state’s constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions, but also
“ ‘the customs and conventions of the people—in their clear con-
sciousness and conviction of what is naturally and inherently just and
right . . . .’ ” 63 Others limit the sources to specific authority, usually
54. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916)).
55. LoPresti v. Rutland Reg’l Health Servs., Inc., 865 A.2d 1102, 1112 (Vt. 2004)
(citation omitted); see also Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1170 (Cal. 1997)
(policy must “ ‘inure[ ] to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the inter-
ests of the individual” (citation omitted)).
56. LoPresti, 865 A.2d at 1112 (quoting Rocky Mtn. Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani,
916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996)).
57. Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W.Va. 2001). Before a court may
declare the existence of a public policy, it must be “ ‘so thoroughly established as a state
of public mind so united and so definite and fixed that its existence is not subject to any
substantial doubt.’ ” Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Kan. 1988) (quoting Noel v.
Menninger Found., 267 P.2d 934 (Kan. 1954)).
58. See, e.g., Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, 972 P.2d 395, 408 (Utah 1998) (citations
omitted); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 74 (Idaho 1990) (citations omitted)
(discussing circumstances entitling employees to a public-policy exception).
59. E.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams,
Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. 1978).
60. E.g., Ressler v. Humane Soc. of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992);
Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc. 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (S.C. 1985).
61. E.g., Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); Firestone
Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 733-34 (Ky.
1983).
62. E.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Ariz. 1985)
(refusal to commit indecent exposure); Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d
25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (refusal to commit perjury).
63. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
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statutes and constitutions, but recognize that certain terminations
might violate the spirit rather than the letter of the laws,64 or that
allowing certain discharges would undermine the policy.65 The most
restrictive view is that public policy may only be legislatively created
and that the employer must have terminated the employee for
refusing to violate a law66 or for a reason explicitly prohibited by a
statute.67 In some states, the need for legislative statements of the
policy leads to an almost absurd circularity: although the doctrine
was judicially-created, states often require a legislative source for
the underlying public policy;68 yet, if the legislature specifically ad-
dresses the issue and provides at least some relief, the statutory
remedy precludes the common-law claim.69 Thus, any evaluation of
the public-policy exception must at least consider, and may conclude
with, relevant legislation.
III. PUBLIC POLICY OF ASSISTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
In 2003, Sandra S. Park called for states to recognize a public-
policy exception to at-will employment for domestic violence victims,
arguing that it would “build[ ] on the work done by battered women’s
advocates challenging the notion that domestic violence is a ‘private’
concern and address[ ] the obstacles faced by employees who experi-
ence domestic violence.” 70 To do otherwise, she posited, effectively
“contributes to re-victimization perpetrated by society as a whole.” 71
Chic. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916)).
64. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (instructing courts
to determine whether the “employer’s conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a con-
stitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme”).
65. Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 283 (Iowa 2000).
66. E.g., Mott v. Montgomery Cnty., 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted)
(recognizing exception only when discharge violates “the terms of a statute, an employment
contract, or result[s] from an employee’s refusal to commit an illegal act”).
67. E.g., Lawson v. S.C. Dept. of Corr., 532 S.E.2d 259, 260-61 (S.C. 2000) (citations
omitted) (explaining that the public-policy exception applies when termination itself
violates criminal law or employers require employees to do so).
68. Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397, 399-400 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 606
S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (per curiam).
69. E.g., Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 212 P.3d 982, 991 (Idaho 2009); Kruchowski v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 202 P.3d 144, 150 (Okla. 2008); Imes, 594 S.E.2d at 399; Ross v.
Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Haw. 1994). Other states permit a common-law
claim unless a “ ‘statutory remedy fully comprehends and envelops the remedies provided
by common law.’ ” Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 95 (Mo. 2010) (en
banc) (quoting Dierkes v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mo., 991 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Mo. 1999)
(en banc)); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn. 1992) (“[W]here a
common law right exists, and a statutory remedy is subsequently created, the statutory
remedy is cumulative unless expressly stated otherwise.”).
70. Park, supra note 9, at 124.
71. Id. at 141.
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This article builds on Park’s work in light of the judicial and legisla-
tive developments that make the public-policy claim even stronger
in some jurisdictions.
A. Judicial Recognition
1. Apessos v. Memorial Press Group
When Park wrote her article, the most recent development was
the 2002 unreported decision from the Massachusetts Superior Court,
Apessos v. Memorial Press Group, which recognized a state policy of
protecting victims from physical and emotional violence and protecting
their livelihoods.72 The court described these interests as “primal” and
“connected,” explaining: “The preservation of a livelihood should serve
to reduce domestic dependence and its concomitant vulnerability to
abuse. A victim should not have to seek physical safety at the cost of
her employment.” 73 In denying the employer’s motion to dismiss, the
court concluded that an employer cannot discharge an employee for
missing one day of work to seek judicial protection, assist police, and
change her locks.74 The court found the policy in the state constitution,
which provides access to the courts and recourse for her injuries; the
state’s Abuse Prevention Act, which provides judicial relief for domes-
tic violence victims; and case law, which protects cooperation with law
enforcement.75 The court seemed most persuaded by the statutory
mandate that a victim of domestic violence who obtains a temporary
protection order, as Ms. Apessos did, appear in court the next business
day to file her complaint.76
2. Vance v. Dispatch Management Service
Not mentioned in Park’s article, but relevant to this issue, is the
2000 decision from the Northern District of Illinois, Vance v. Dispatch
Management Services, which held that terminating an employee for
obtaining a protective order against an ex-domestic partner and cur-
rent co-worker violates Illinois’s public policy.77 The court explained
that “policies affecting the health and safety of citizens will support
72. Apessos v. Memorial Press Group, No. 01-1474-A, 2002 WL 31324115, at *3 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2002).
73. Id.
74. Id. at *1, *3.
75. Id. at *3.
76. Id.
77. Vance v. Dispatch Mgmt. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 910, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
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a retaliatory discharge claim,” and that seeking court protection for
violence by a current or former domestic partner “would appear to
involve the protection of each citizen’s health and welfare.” 78 The
court further concluded that this situation is analogous to the line
of cases establishing a violation of public policy for discharging an
employee for reporting illegal or improper conduct.79
3. Green v. Bryant
Park also considered one other published decision on the issue,
a now fifteen-year-old case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
which rejected a public-policy exception for a domestic violence vic-
tim.80 Green v. Bryant involved an employee who reported to her em-
ployer that she had been violently assaulted by her husband and
sought medical treatment for her injuries.81 Her employer not only
fired her, but also retroactively terminated her health insurance so
that her treatment costs were not covered.82 The employee alleged
that the employer admitted that the discharge was based “solely upon
her being the victim of a violent crime.” 83
The employee claimed that her termination violated two policy
interests: “protecting an employee’s right to privacy and protecting
victims of crime or spousal abuse.” 84 The court rejected the privacy
claim because she volunteered the information about the abuse to her
78. Id.
79. Id. at 911-12 (citing Howard v. Zack Co., 637 N.E. 2d 1183, 1190 (1994)). In
addition to Apessos and Vance, two other unpublished decisions since Park’s article provide
at least limited support for a public-policy claim. See Greer v. Beck’s Pub & Grille, No.
6:03-cv-02070-LRR, *32 (N.D. Iowa, Jan. 4, 2006) (declining to dismiss a public-policy-
based claim alleging termination for obtaining a protective order); Pooley v. Union Cnty.,
No. 01-343-JE, at *38 (D. Or., Mar. 17, 2003) (“[P]articipating in the criminal prosecution
of one who commits domestic violence and seeking and modifying restraining orders
appears to qualify as an ‘employment related right of important public interest.’ ”
(citation omitted)).  Both decisions are available through PACER and on file with the
author.
80. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
81. Id. at 800.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court presumed, without any reference to the employer’s arguments, that
the employer may have had concerns about “physical or emotional danger to other em-
ployees or patients” if the employee’s ex-husband came into the workplace. Id. at 800 n.2.
Not only does it seem improper for the court to presume the employer’s motivations, it
should be irrelevant to the public policy element. If a policy interest were established, then
the employer could have argued that it had some other justification for the termination.
The employer should not be able to assume that the ex-husband presented harm to the
workplace and reflexively terminate the victim’s employment. See Goldscheid, supra note
16, at 98 (arguing that firing victims for their spouses’ actions “harkens back to coverture,
when a husband and wife were treated as one legal person”).
84. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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employers.85 With respect to the policy to protect domestic violence
victims, the court held that although Pennsylvania’s Protection from
Abuse Act “provides certain procedures and protections, they do not
thereby create a protected employment class.” 86 In other words, the
court determined that because Pennsylvania’s law did not create any
employment rights or privileges, it could not serve as the basis for a
public-policy exception to the at-will doctrine. The court acknowledged,
however, that “[i]t might be a different case, and a closer question
as to the public policy exception, if plaintiff alleged that she was dis-
charged because she had applied for victim compensation or had
sought a protective order.” 87
4. Imes v. City of Asheville
Just after Park’s article, the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
in Imes v. City of Asheville, rejected a wrongful discharge claim by a
male employee who alleged his employer admitted to firing him be-
cause he was a victim of domestic violence.88 The employee, who had
worked for the company for over twenty-five years, was fired one
month after being hospitalized for gunshot injuries inflicted by his
wife.89 Narrowly defining the public policy that it may recognize, the
court determined that the employee’s claim failed because the em-
ployer’s conduct did not violate “any explicit statutory or constitu-
tional provision,” and the employer did not encourage the employee “to
violate any law that might result in potential harm to the public.” 90
With respect to North Carolina’s domestic abuse laws, the court
characterized them as providing “various protections for victims of
domestic violence,” but not establishing them as a “protected class of
persons or extend[ing] employment security status to such persons.”91
It contrasted the statutory language with that in the employment
discrimination statute, which explicitly announces the “ ‘public
policy . . . to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all
persons to seek, obtain and hold employment . . . .’ ” 92 The court
agreed with the employee and the dissent that “domestic violence is
a serious social problem,” but characterized it as “one of many social
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d per curiam,
606 S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 399.
91. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 et seq. (2003)).
92. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (2003)).
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problems” that North Carolina’s laws seek to address, and not one
for which the legislature had provided employment protection.93
The dissent in Imes cautioned against rigidly defining public
policy and reminded the court that, “ ‘[t]rue to common law tradition,
we allow this still evolving area of the law to mature slowly, decid-
ing each case on the facts before us.’ ” 94 It looked to North Carolina’s
Domestic Violence Act, which authorized courts to prohibit abusers
from entering the workplace, and its unemployment compensation
laws, which provides benefits to those forced to leave or discharged
from work, as evidence of the state’s “strong public policy aimed not
only at supporting victims of domestic violence, but also at preventing
the effects of domestic violence from entering the workplace.” 95
5. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services
Four years later, the Washington Supreme Court took the ap-
proach encouraged by the Imes dissent, reviewed the state’s relevant
laws and policies, and reached a dramatically different conclusion.96
In Danny, after removing the matter to federal district court, the em-
ployer moved to dismiss the wrongful discharge claim.97 To resolve the
motion, the federal court certified to the Washington Supreme Court
the question of whether the state had “a clear mandate of public policy
prohibiting an employer from discharging an at-will employee be-
cause she experienced domestic violence and took leave from work
to take actions to protect herself, her family, and to hold her abuser
accountable.” 98 Seeking to remove any questions of fact and to focus
on the public policy issue, the Washington Supreme Court instead con-
sidered whether the state had “established a clear mandate of public
policy of protecting domestic violence survivors and their families
and holding their abusers accountable.” 99 Thus, the court’s conclu-
sion that the state did, in fact, have such a policy did not reach the
factual questions of whether this particular discharge violated a
public policy or whether the employer was required to provide time
off to this employee.100
93. Id.
94. Imes, 594 S.E.2d at 401 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (quoting Amos v.
Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 169 n.1 (1992)).
95. Id. at 402 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-3(a), 96-14(1)(f) (2003)). In fact, effective
later that same year, the North Carolina legislature enacted a law that prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees who take “reasonable time off” to seek court pro-
tection from domestic violence. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50B-5.5, 95-270(a) (West 2010).
96. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 155 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id. at 130.
99. Id.
100. After the Washington Supreme Court’s decision on this certified question, the
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In analyzing the public-policy question, the court explained
that the employee must demonstrate that the asserted policy is both
“ ‘truly public’ ” and “sufficiently clear.”101 Relying on the legislature’s
“repeated[ ] and unequivocal[ ]” declarations that “domestic violence
is an immense problem that impacts entire communities,” the court
had little difficulty characterizing the policy to prevent domestic vio-
lence as public.102 For the clarity of the policy, the court again relied
primarily on the state’s legislative enactments in the last thirty years,
which it characterized as “clear, concrete actions to encourage domes-
tic violence victims to end abuse, leave their abusers, protect their
children, and cooperate with law enforcement and prosecution efforts
to hold the abuser accountable.”103 It reinforced this conclusion with
references to administrative, constitutional, and judicial expressions
of the same policy.104 It also looked to judicial law as a source of addi-
tional relevant policies, including “protecting human life from immi-
nent harm.”105
The court clarified that the policy need not be one specific to
employment, but rather that “an employer may be liable for wrong-
ful discharge if the employer fires an employee for taking actions nec-
essary to protect that policy, regardless of whether the public policy
itself addresses the employment context.”106 It explained that the
contrary view, urged by the employer and the concurrence/dissent,
would essentially conflate the first two elements of the wrongful
discharge claim and require the court to evaluate the employer’s
conduct while determining whether a public policy exists.107
parties ultimately resolved the federal matter through mediation, and the court formally
dismissed the action on March 6, 2009. Danny v. First Transit, No. C05-1047RSL, Order
of Dismissal (March 6, 2009) (available through PACER and on file with the author).
101. Danny, 193 P.3d at 131 (citing Sedlacek v. Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Wash.
2001)).
102. Id. at 135. The court clarified that to be public, the policy must “ ‘concern[ ] what
is right and just’ ” and “ ‘affect[ ] the citizens of the State collectively.’ ” Id. at 131 (quoting
Dicomes v. Sate, 782 P.2d 1002 (Wash. 1989) (citation omitted)).
103. Id. at 134. At the time of the court’s decision, Washington had enacted legislation
that required employers to grant leave to domestic violence victims. The concurrence/
dissent argued that the majority opinion improperly gave retroactive effect to the legis-
lation, which did not exist when the employee was discharged. Id. at 142 (Madsen, J.,
concurring/dissenting). The majority referenced the new legislation as additional support
that the state’s policy “supports liability for employers who thwart their employees’ efforts
to protect themselves from domestic violence,” though it did not rely on this law for its char-
acterization of the state’s policy. Id. at 138.
104. Danny, 193 P.3d at 135-36.
105. Id. at 137 (citing Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 383 (1996)).
106. Id. at 138 (citing Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 383 (1996)).
107. Id. at 137. The concurrence/dissent characterized the “threshold issue of law” as
“whether a ‘clear mandate of public policy’ forbids an employer from discharging an
employee for a particular reason.” Id. at 143 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting) (citing
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984)). A separate dissent
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Even the concurrence/dissent agreed that “public policy clearly
prohibits employers from discharging an employee for obtaining a pro-
tection order, filing a complaint against an abuser, cooperating with
the investigation and prosecution of the alleged abuser, finding alter-
native living arrangements, or accessing support services for domestic
violence victims.”108 Its primary disagreement with the majority opin-
ion was its view that it essentially prohibited an employer from dis-
charging an employee for absenteeism related to these actions.109
The majority responded to this critique by explaining that this
issue was irrelevant to the public policy analysis, but rather relates
to the second element—whether the employer’s conduct jeopardized
the public policy—and required a fact-intensive inquiry that the dis-
trict court must resolve.110 The majority explained that for the plain-
tiff to satisfy the jeopardy element, she must show that her conduct
“ ‘directly relates to the public policy, or was necessary for the effec-
tive enforcement of the public policy.’ ”111 In this case, the employee
would have to establish that the time off from work “was the only
available adequate means to prevent domestic violence against her-
self or her children or to hold her abuser accountable” by introduc-
ing evidence of the particular circumstances—including her work
schedule, the abuser’s schedule, and the availability of necessary
services—that justified her missing work.112 The majority stated that
the concurrence/dissent would go to the opposite extreme and decide
as a matter of law that time off from work would never be necessary.113
This view, according to the majority, would discourage employees to
take even a “morning off work to get a protection order, to give a state-
ment to police, or to move her children out of imminent harm’s way,”
and would, in effect, “directly endanger our community’s efforts to end
domestic violence.” 114
concluded that while the legislature has enacted a “web of protections in the domestic
violence arena . . . none evinces a clear articulation of public policy that changes the legal
relationship between employer and employees.” Id. at 152 (Johnson, J., dissenting). It
also argued that it is precisely because the state has enacted so many statutory protections
for victims without addressing the employment context further supports that there is no
such “clear mandate of public policy.” Danny, 193 P.3d at 155.
108. Id. at 146 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting).
109. Id. Echoing the view of earlier of cases on this issue, the court stated, “[t]he public
policy tort exception to the at-will doctrine is not a vehicle by which this court may con-
script employers to shoulder the burden of a societal problem.” Id. at 143.
110. Id. at 138-39.
111. Id. at 139 (quoting Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 384 (1996)).
112. Danny, 193 P.3d at 139.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 141. The concurrence/dissent countered that the lead opinion fails to balance
the employers’ interests with the societal interest involved, and does not explain why
employers should bear the burden of accommodating the employees’ needs. Id. at 148-49.
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B. Statutory Support
In these cases, and in fact in all cases that entertain the public-
policy question, courts may consider any relevant statutory support
for the alleged policy. As part of her analysis of the public-policy
exception, Park summarized the many state laws that either directly
or indirectly express a policy in favor of protecting those who experi-
ence domestic violence from employment consequences.115 Since her
article, the number and type of workplace legislation available to
domestic violence victims has only increased.116 Currently, at least
fourteen states specifically protect employees experiencing domestic
violence by requiring that at least some employers provide job-
protected leave to employees seeking judicial relief from the
violence.117 Nine of these states expand the leave to cover time off to
access other services, such as medical care, counseling, safety plan-
ning, or relocation assistance.118 The District of Columbia provides
paid leave for similar kinds of absences.119 In addition to job-protected
leave, both Illinois and, since January 2010, Oregon law prohibit
employment discrimination based on an employee’s experience of
domestic violence and require employers to provide reasonable accom-
modations for these employees, which may include a modified
schedule, a changed telephone or seating assignment, implementation
It also does not explain why this exception applies to victims of domestic violence as op-
posed to all crime victims or any employee who wishes to exercise some legislative right.
Id. at 149. These determinations, it believes, are matters for the legislature as the policy-
making branch of government, and not for the courts. Id.
115. Park, supra note 9, at 125-26, 146-56.
116. For example, Park identified five domestic-violence-specific leave statutes, id. at
146-47; eighteen states that provided unemployment insurance to victims of domestic
violence, id. at 125; and only one city law that prohibited discrimination against victims
of abuse, id. at 126. For a current and regularly updated summary of domestic violence-
related workplace legislation, see Employment and Housing Rights for Victims of
Domestic Violence, LEGAL MOMENTUM, http://www.legalmomentum.org/legal-knowledge
/publications/employment-and-housing-rights.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) (providing
links to various state law guides).
117. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230, 230.1(a) (Deering 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-
402.7(1)(a) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85b(a) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.313(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN § 378-72(a) (LexisNexis 2010);
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/20(1) (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23(1) (West 
2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1132(a) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850(1) ( 2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518B.01(23), 609.748(10) (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4A-3
(LexisNexis 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-5.5(a) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 659A.272 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.76.030 (LexisNexis 2010).
118. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230 & 230.1 (Deering 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
402.79(1)(a)(II)-(III) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.313(2)(b)(2)-(4) (LexisNexis 2010);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-72(a)(1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2010); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 180/20(1)(A)-(D) (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1132(a)(1)-(3) (2009); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850(1)(B)-(C) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.272 (West 2010);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.76.030 (LexisNexis 2010).
119. D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(4) (LexisNexis 2010).
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of safety precautions, or assistance in documenting any abuse that
occurs at the workplace.120 Thirty-four states’ statutes seek to pro-
tect crime victims and witnesses more generally, and particularly
those subpoenaed to attend a judicial proceeding, by providing at
least some job-protected leave.121 Several states also permit employ-
ers to seek workplace restraining orders on behalf of their employ-
ees who have experienced domestic violence.122 At least 31 states
provide unemployment benefits to employees who voluntarily leave
their jobs due to reasons related to documented domestic violence,123
120. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/30(a), (b)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.290(1)(a),(2) (West 2010).
121. ALA. CODE § 15-23-81 (2010); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017(a) (West 2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4439(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (West
2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-303(8) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
85b(a) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.57
(LexisNexis 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-3(a) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 621-
10.5(a) (LexisNexis 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-11.1 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 915.23(1) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500(8) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN.
CRIM. PROC. § 11-102(b) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-205(a) (West
2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 14B (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
780.762(1), 780.790(1) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.036(1)-(3) (West 2009);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-45 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(14) (West 2010);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-205(3) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.070(1) (West 2009);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:62(I)-(II) (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14(1)
(McKinney 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-09.1-17(1) (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2930.18, 2945.451 (West 2010); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4957(a) (West 2010); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 12-28-13(a)-(b) (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550(A) (2009); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-4-122(a)-(b) (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-132(1) (West 2010);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (West 2010); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-209(a)-(b) (West 2010).
122. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1810(A) (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(a),
(c) (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(4)(b) (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-
7(b) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-6-6 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.270
(West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-264(b) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-52-2(a)
(West 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-14-108 (West 2010). For a critique of how these laws
impact employee-victims’ autonomy and may even cause them harm, see Widiss, supra
note 10, at 715 (describing how protective orders taken out by the victim’s employer could
result in more danger to both the employee and other colleagues).
123. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-771(D) (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513
(b)(3)(A) (West 2010); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1030(a)(5), 1032(d), 1256 (Deering
2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-73-107(1)(g)(II)(B), 108(4)(r)(I) (West 2010); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-236(a)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3314(1)
(West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383-7.6 (a)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 405/601(B)(6) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4-15-1(1)(c)(8), 22-4-15-
1(1)(e), 5-26.5-2-2 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(a)(12)(A) (2009); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 23:1774(B) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 1193(1)(A)(4) (2009); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, §§ 1(g)(½), 14(d)(3), 25(e), 30(c) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
268.095(1)(9) (West 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.501(2)(c) (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-
51-2111(1)(a) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-628.01(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(I)(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(j) (West
2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-7 A(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(1)(b)(i)
(McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 96-14(b)(1f) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 2-210(4)(d) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657.176(12) (West 2010); R.I. GEN.
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and some even provide benefits to persons discharged for conduct
related to the violence.124
Some of the clearest and most comprehensive statements of the
public policy interests at stake in these kinds of cases come from the
statements of purpose in this emerging legislation. The first of its
kind, Illinois’s Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act, seeks:
[T]o promote the State’s interest in reducing domestic violence,
dating violence, sexual assault and stalking by enabling victims of
domestic or sexual violence to maintain the financial independence
necessary to leave abusive situations, achieve safety, and minimize
the physical and emotional injuries from domestic or sexual vio-
lence, and to reduce the devastating economic consequences of
domestic or sexual violence to employers and employees . . . .125
Washington’s statute, effective April 2008, similarly recognizes:
It is in the public interest to reduce domestic violence, sexual
assault, and stalking by enabling victims to maintain the financial
independence necessary to leave abusive situations, achieve safety,
and minimize physical and emotional injuries, and to reduce the
devastating economic consequences of domestic violence, sexual
assault, and stalking to employers and employees. Victims of
domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking should be able to
recover from and cope with the effects of such violence and partici-
pate in criminal and civil justice processes without fear of adverse
economic consequences.126
These statutes clarify that domestic violence is not just an individual
employee’s problem, but one that impacts the public and that em-
ployers can help address.
LAWS ANN. § 28-44-17.1(a) (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-125(A) (2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-13.1(6) (2010); TEXAS LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.046(a)(2) (West 2009);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, ch. 16A § 1251 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
50.20.050(1)(b)(4), 50.20.240(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(7)(r)(2)(a)
(West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-311(a)(i)(c) (West 2010). For a discussion of the
development of and rationale behind these laws, see Rebecca Smith, Richard N. McHugh
& Robin R. Runge, Unemployment Insurance and Domestic Violence: Learning from our
Experiences, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 503, 503, 508-10, 515, 518-19 (2002) (noting how
victims of domestic violence have used unemployment benefits to secure income during
periods of unemployment caused by abuse).
124. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 1043(23)(B)(3) (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 268.095(1)(9), (6)(b)(10) (West 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.501(2)(c) (West 2010); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-51-2111(1)(a) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(j) (West 2010).
125. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15(1) (West 2010). Originally enacted in 2003, this
law was recently modified to, among other things, expand its reach to more employers.
S.B. 1770, § 5 (2009) (changing employer definition from those with fifty employees to those
with fifteen).
126. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.76.010(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
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IV. POTENTIAL FOR STATE RECOGNITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PUBLIC POLICY
Although several scholars have accurately concluded that the
public policy exception currently is an undeveloped, unpredictable,
and inadequate remedy for employees terminated because of domestic
violence,127 the recent “explosion” of workplace legislation and the
Danny decision breathe new life into this claim. While a comprehen-
sive analysis of the public-policy exception is nearly impossible be-
cause of the great variability in state approaches,128 general coverage
of the doctrine leaves too many questions unanswered. Thus, this
article attempts to strike a balance between the two extremes by con-
ducting a nationwide analysis, but limiting the scope to focus on only
one source of public policy, state legislation, and specifically, only state
abuse prevention acts and state employment laws related to crime
victims or to employees experiencing domestic violence.129 It further
narrows the scope to only the state abuse prevention acts and employ-
ment laws related to crime victims in general, or to employees who
have experienced domestic violence, specifically.130 In nearly every
state, there are other sources of policy that should be explored. In-
deed, even without considering Washington’s new workplace protec-
tions, the Washington Supreme Court recognized that the states’
myriad laws addressing this societal issue convey a strong public
policy that should impact employment decisions.131 But workplace
127. For example, Professor Tarr reviewed Park’s work and concluded that the exception
is “not reliable enough or inclusive enough to ensure the economic security of domestic vio-
lence victims” and that, even if it were effective, it does not require employers to accom-
modate employees or address discrimination short of termination. Tarr, supra note 40,
at 402. Similarly, Professor Widiss references Park’s work and several unpublished deci-
sions on the public-policy exception and concludes that “many courts would hold that is
perfectly legal for an employer to fire at will a victim of domestic violence based on the
abuse against her.” Widiss, supra note 10, at 684-85.
128. PAUL H. TOBIAS, LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 5.1, n.2 (West 2009)
(“The extremely wide variety of factual variations that courts have addressed, and the lack
of consistency in their analytical methods, make impossible any systematic and exhaustive
classification of the decisions on a nationwide basis.”).
129. All states that recognize the exception, recognize state legislation as a valid source
of public policy. The more restrictive view requires state statute or constitution as source
of public policy. Id. § 5.4. Some state legislatures have explicitly restricted the public-policy
exceptions to those they create. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501(3)(b) (LexisNexis
2010).
130. In particular, this article’s analysis is limited to those state laws summarized above.
See supra Part III.B (summarizing the relevant legislation, including unemployment
insurance, leave laws, and workplace restraining orders).
131. In addition to Washington’s abuse prevention act and its very recently enacted
employment-specific protections for victims of domestic violence, the court looked to state
laws relating to police response, confidentiality, funding for legal services, new crimes and
penalties for perpetrators’ interference, and child abuse prevention; the executive order
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legislation seems to hold the greatest promise for supporting this
common-law claim.
State legislation is just one of the three variables in this national
analysis. The main organizing variable considered is the states’ recep-
tivity to the common-law exception, which I have used to group the
states into three categories: those that generally recognize the claim,
but with varying definitions of “public policy”; those with limited recog-
nition of the claim; and those that have not recognized the exception.
The final variable is the extent to which any workplace legislation
either buttresses or precludes the courts from recognizing a common-
law remedy. In some states, the common-law remedy is necessary
to implement certain legislation and in others, where the statutory
remedy is clear, the courts may defer to the legislature and refuse
to adopt any different or additional common-law remedy.132
The foregoing analysis thus considers these three variables in
various ways to address each state’s likelihood of recognizing a public
policy in support of promoting financial stability for victims of domes-
tic violence. Just like the Danny decision, this analysis does not go
beyond the public-policy element, however. Assuming employees can
successfully establish this element, they will still face the state-
specific burdens of establishing the other elements of the claim, and
employers may have lawful justification for their decisions.133
A. General Acceptance
The majority of states recognize a public-policy exception with
sufficient flexibility to apply in this context.134 Nonetheless, all of
these states view the exception as extremely limited,135 and require
the policy to be exceedingly clear and sufficiently public.136 More-
that state agencies assist employees experiencing domestic violence, including providing
unpaid leave; the state constitution’s support for crime-victim cooperation; and the judicial
opinions that express an interest in preventing domestic violence, encouraging citizen coop-
eration with police, and protecting human life. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193
P.3d 128, 132-38 (Wash. 2008) (en banc). In addition to these laws, Park identified as pos-
sible bases for a wrongful discharge claim: “statutes and policies supporting the right to
physical safety; policies guaranteeing individuals’ right to go to court; and federal and state
anti-discrimination statutes.” Park, supra note 9, at 145-46 (omitting numerals).
132. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (providing an example of state statutes
limiting common-law remedy).
133. See supra Part III.A.5 (summarizing Danny) and Part II.A (listing the other
elements in certain states’ claims).
134. See infra Part IV.D (summarizing the more than thirty states that recognize the
exception in some way).
135. E.g., Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 562-63 (Pa. 2009) (citing Clay v. Advanced
Computer Applications, 559 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa. 1989)).
136. E.g., Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405-06 (Utah 1998).
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over, in some of the states, a legislatively-created remedy may limit
a common-law claim.137 Thus, further analysis of each state is re-
quired to determine their relative receptivity to the exception in the
context of employees experiencing domestic violence.
1. Previous Judicial Recognition
Within this larger group of states that generally recognize the
exception are the four states whose laws have been interpreted to
support a public-policy exception for terminations related to domestic
violence before the Danny decision: Massachusetts, Iowa, Illinois, and
Oregon.138 Because these decisions, either unreported or from a fed-
eral court, are not binding precedent in these states,139 the state courts’
future receptivity to such claims warrants some attention. Based on
their common-law exceptions and relevant statutes, Massachusetts
and Iowa courts most likely would recognize future claims, at least
those involving employees who sought judicial relief from their
abuse or who cooperated in the criminal prosecution of the abusers.140
Illinois and Oregon’s subsequently enacted workplace legislation, on
the other hand, probably precludes most future common-law claims.141
Both Massachusetts and Iowa recognize a common-law claim
broad enough to include terminations related to domestic violence.
Specifically, Iowa’s exception is not limited to terminations explicitly
prohibited by a statute, but rather any termination that undermines
a statute’s underlying policy.142 Massachusetts recognizes the excep-
tion when an employee is “terminated for asserting a legally guaran-
teed right . . . doing what the law requires . . . refusing to do what the
law forbids . . .” and cooperating with law enforcement.143
These two states’ statutes also generally support a policy in favor
of assisting victims of domestic violence. The abuse prevention acts
in Iowa and Massachusetts specifically authorize courts to restrain
137. E.g., Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, 745 A.2d 178, 181 (Conn. 2000) (determining that
the statute precluded wrongful discharge claim).
138. See supra Parts III.A.1-2 (summarizing the judicial decisions supporting this
public policy).
139. 20 AM.JUR.2D COURTS § 148 (2010); 21 C.J.S. COURTS § 234 (2010).
140. See supra Parts III.A.1-2 (explaining the Iowa and Massachusetts decisions, both
of which involved employees who sought judicial relief and assisted with the criminal prose-
cution of their abusive partners).
141. See infra Part IV.A.3.c (analyzing states with domestic-violence-specific workplace
legislation).
142. Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 283 (Iowa 2000) (stating that
the exception is not limited to express statutory prohibitions, but rather, extends to  any
termination that would undermine policy).
143. Wright v. Shriners Hosp., 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (Mass. 1992).
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offenders from the victim’s place of work,144 and Massachusetts pro-
vides unemployment benefits to employees forced to leave their work
due to domestic violence.145 Iowa and Massachusetts also provide some
protection for employees who participate in judicial proceedings.146
Thus, both states seem ripe for further development of the exception
to at-will employment for terminations that undermine their states’
fairly clear policies encouraging a stable income for crime victims and
those who experience domestic violence. The previous decisions and
the statutes, however, may limit the claim to employees who seek
judicial relief or assist with a criminal prosecution.
2. Broad Public Policy Definitions
In two additional states, New Hampshire and Vermont, the
public-policy definitions and the relevant statutory language combine
to provide strong support for this common-law claim. Both states
define “pubic policy” broadly. Vermont recognizes policies that come
not only from the constitution, a statute, or a judicial decision, but also
from “the customs and conventions of the people—in their clear con-
sciousness and conviction of what is naturally and inherently just and
right.”147 New Hampshire’s policies similarly need not be explicit in
any statute, nor “strong and clear.”148 Employees must establish that
they were discharged for “performing an act that public policy would
144. IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(1)(b)(3) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A,
§§ 1, 3(c) (West 2010). After violation of an order, the court may require the defendant
to wear a GPS and include plaintiff’s place of employment in a geographic exclusion
zone. Id. § 7.
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, §§ 1, 14, 25, 30 (West 2010).
146. IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23 (West 2009) (protecting an employee who testifies in
a criminal or Domestic Abuse Act proceeding); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 14B
(LexisNexis 2010) (protecting crime victim attending a criminal proceeding). Iowa’s statute
may actually preclude some common-law claims, however, because it provides a remedy
for aggrieved employees. IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23 (West 2009) (allowing actual damages,
court costs, and attorney fees and injunctive relief, including reinstatement). Iowa courts
may thus view the statute, not the wrongful termination claim, as controlling. See Vaughn
v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 638 (Iowa 1990) (denying claim based on religious
discrimination as preempted by Iowa Civil Rights Act).
147. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588-89 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916)). In Payne, the
Vermont Supreme Court recognized a wrongful termination claim alleging age dis-
crimination before such allegations were statutorily recognized. The court described age
discrimination as “so contrary to our society’s concern for providing equity and justice
that there is a clear and compelling public policy against it.” Id. at 589.
148. Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1145 (N.H. 1981). New
Hampshire also defers to the jury to determine what constitutes a “public policy” sufficient
for this claim. Id.; Cilley v. N.H. Ball Bearings, 514 A.2d 818, 821 (N.H. 1981) (citation
omitted).
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encourage, or refusing to do something that public policy would con-
demn” and that the employer was motivated by “bad faith, malice,
or retaliation.” 149
While neither state requires statutory support, both have similar
statutes that evince some support for a policy of protecting employees
experiencing domestic violence. New Hampshire’s abuse prevention
act explicitly allows courts to restrain defendants from entering the
plaintiff’s place of work.150 Both states’ unemployment compensation
laws provide benefits to employees who left their employment for rea-
sons related to intimate violence, with Vermont’s specifically requiring
employees to establish that they “pursued reasonable alternatives.”151
To allow employers to simply terminate an employee’s employment
once violence became known to the employer would undermine this
statutory scheme, the underlying purpose of which is to provide finan-
cial assistance to these employees.152 In addition, both states provide
some employment protection for crime victims, generally. New Hamp-
shire prohibits employers with twenty-five or more employees from
terminating their employment for missing work to attend “legal or
investigative proceedings associated with the prosecution of the
crime.”153 Vermont prohibits employers from discharging or disciplin-
ing a crime victim for honoring a subpoena to testify.154 The public-
policy exception would assist in implementing these statutes, as
neither provides a specific remedy for the affected employees.155
3. Domestic Violence-Specific Workplace Legislation
The analysis of at least eight states and the District of Columbia’s
receptivity to this claim turns on their relatively new workplace leg-
islation, which either bolsters or precludes the common-law claim
depending on the extent of the legislative remedy provided and the
extent of the legislative remedy and of the court’s deference to that
remedy.
149. Porter v. Manchester, 849 A.2d 103, 114 (N.H. 2004) (quoting Cloutier, 436 A.2d
at 1143).
150. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:4(I)(a)(6) & 173-B:5(I)(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2010).
151. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(I)(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
ch. 16A § 1253 (West 2010).
152. See Smith et al., supra note 123, at 503 (explaining the purpose of providing
financial assistance to employees who are victims of domestic violence).
153. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:62 (LexisNexis 2010).
154. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (West 2009).
155. New Hampshire’s law penalizes employers who violate employees’ leave rights,
but does not provide employees with any specific cause of action. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 275:65 (LexisNexis 2010).
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a. Broad Workplace Legislation Strengthens Common-
Law Claim
In at least three jurisdictions—California, Kansas, and the
District of Columbia—the workplace legislation provides strong
support for common-law recognition of a relatively broad claim.
These three jurisdictions vary significantly in their acceptance of
the public-policy exception, with California having one of the most
established and liberal exceptions,156 and Kansas and D.C.’s excep-
tions being more limited.157 These three jurisdictions’ strong and
explicit workplace protections for employees experiencing domestic
violence make them quite similar in their potential receptivity to
additional common-law protection.
All three jurisdictions’ statutes not only provide job-protected
leave to employees who turn to the civil or criminal justice system,158
but also to those who turn to other resources in response to the vio-
lence, including medical or mental-health care, safety planning, and
other assistance from domestic violence programs.159 Specifically,
D.C.’s Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act of 2008160 provides all em-
ployees paid sick leave for these specific reasons and those others
that “enhance the physical, psychological, or economic health or safe-
ty” of themselves, a family member, or a co-worker if they or their
family members have experienced intimate violence.161 In Kansas,
all employers have been required since 2006 to provide up to eight
156. California was the first state to recognize the public-policy exception, and it has
since applied it in several contexts. See TOBIAS, supra note 128, app. 5A (stating that
California courts have since “issued dozens of opinions concerning the scope and
application” of the exception).
157. Kansas courts have not yet applied the common-law exception beyond the context
of retaliation for whistle-blowing or filing a workers’ compensation claim. Palmer v. Brown,
752 P.2d 685, 689 (Kan. 1988). The D.C. courts so far have applied the exception only to
discharges for refusing to violate the law. Vreven v. Am. Ass’n of Retired Persons, 604
F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C.
1997) (Terry, J., concurring)). D.C. courts recognize a claim by employees who act “in
furtherance of a public policy ‘solidly based on a statute or regulation . . . .’ ” Id. Kansas
courts do not insist on specific legislation, see Murphy v. Topeka-Shawnee Dept. of Labor
Servs., 630 P.2d 186, 192 (Kan. 1981) (noting the legislature’s failure to create a cause of
action does not defeat the public policy), but they do require the policy to be “ ‘so thor-
oughly established as a state of public mind so united and so definite and fixed that is
existence is not subject to any substantial doubt.’ ” Palmer, 752 P.2d at 687 (Kan. 1988)
(quoting Noel v. Menninger Found., 267 P.2d 934, 941 (Kan. 1954)).
158. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(b), (c) (Deering 2009); D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(b)(4)(E)
(LexisNexis 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132(a)(1), (a)(4) (2010).
159. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.1 (Deering 2009); D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(b)(4) (LexisNexis
2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132(a) (West 2009).
160. D.C. CODE §§ 32-131.01-131.1.16 (LexisNexis 2010).
161. D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2010). The amount of the required leave,
which accrues by the hours worked, depends on the size of the employer. Id. § 32-131.02(a).
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days of job-protected leave.162 California’s 2003 law provides up to
three days leave to those employees working for employers with
twenty-five or more employees.163
Not only do these statutes provide strong support for a public
policy to protect employees experiencing domestic violence, the com-
mon-law remedy they support may play a critical role in their imple-
mentation. Neither the D.C. nor the Kansas legislation specifies the
cause of action or relief available to employees harmed by employer
violations.164 A wrongful discharge claim thus provides the basis for
relief to these employees. While California’s law creates an admin-
istrative complaint process and remedy for employees harmed by their
employers’ conduct, these employees could still pursue a wrongful
discharge claim through the courts unless the court were to determine
that the statute created a right that did not exist at common law or
that the legislative intent was to supplant the common law.165
b. More Limited Workplace Legislation Supports Claim
Two additional states, New Mexico and Arizona, have leave legis-
lation that should provide a strong basis for common-law protection
of at least those employees who seek judicial protection from domestic
violence. Effective July 2009, New Mexico’s leave legislation, aptly en-
titled the Promoting Financial Independence for Victims of Domestic
Abuse Act, specifically requires employers to provide up to fourteen
days of intermittent leave to employees to seek an order for protection
or to meet with law enforcement or otherwise assist in a criminal
prosecution.166 It also prohibits any retaliation against employees who
exercise their leave rights.167 Like California’s statute, New Mexico’s
162. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1131-33 (West 2009).
163. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.1 (Deering 2009).
164. The D.C. law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who
request leave and assesses fines against the employers. D.C. CODE §§ 32-131.08-131.12
(LexisNexis 2010). It also directs the Department of Employment Services to administer
the law, and authorizes the Mayor to issue rules to implement the statute, §§ 32-131.10-
131.13 (LexisNexis 2010), but the statute itself does not specify an employee cause of
action. Similarly, the Kansas legislature clarified in 2008 that the Department of Labor
shall enforce these statutes, but did not itself specify the remedy or procedure. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1133 (West 2009). Kansas courts require a detailed analysis of the adequacy
of any statutory relief before precluding a common-law claim. See Flenker v. Willamette
Indus., 967 P.2d 295, 298 (Kan. 1998) (following the interpretation in Polson v. Davis, 895
F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990)).
165. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 381, 388 (Cal. 1990) (allowing a claim alleging dis-
crimination because of public interest in a “workplace free from the pernicious influence
of sexism”).
166. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-4A-1, -2 (LexisNexis 2010).
167. Id. §§ 50-4A-2(B), -3.
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law provides for administrative enforcement, but also clarifies that its
remedies supplement rather than replace any common law relief.168
New Mexico courts have recognized a wrongful discharge claim when
an employee is fired for performing “an act that public policy [has
authorized or] would encourage.”169 The exception seeks to encourage
job security, generally.170 New Mexico’s courts should use this claim
to enforce the clear policy stated in the new legislation.
Arizona’s leave legislation is more limited, and while its common-
law doctrine will not increase the statutory scope, it is again neces-
sary to enforce the leave rights. The Arizona law mandates employers
with fifty or more employees to provide job-protected leave to crime
victims and employees who seek judicial protection for themselves
or their family members and prohibits the discharge of or refusal to
hire employees who exercise these leave rights.171 The statute does
not, however, provide any particular remedy to harmed employees.
While Arizona legislation has limited the public policy exception to
those expressed in state statutes, it has also explicitly recognized that
it applies to terminations for exercising these particular leave rights.172
In other words, the Arizona legislature has essentially instructed the
courts to apply the public-policy exception to terminating employees
for exercising their rights. Employees working for smaller employers,
however, would not have a wrongful discharge claim because, as the
statute clarifies, “[a]ll definitions and restrictions contained in the
statute also apply to any civil action based on a violation of the public
policy arising out of the statute.”173
c. Workplace Legislation Precludes Common-Law Claims
Four other states—Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon, and Connecticut—
have enacted workplace protection for domestic violence victims, but
because of those states’ common-law exceptions and the particular
168. Id. §§ 50-4A-7, -8.
169. Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Chavez v. Manville
Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989).
170. Id. at 618.
171. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4439 (LexisNexis 2010).
172. Id. §§ 23-1501(3)(b), (3)(c)(x). Prior to this legislation, Arizona courts had
recognized a broader common-law exception for “firing for bad cause” or for one that is
“against public policy articulated in constitutional, statutory, or decisional law.” Murcott
v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 9 P.3d 1088, 1095-96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (1985)).
173. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1501(3)(b), 13.4439(A) (2010); see also Taylor v.
Graham Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 33 P.3d 518, 524-25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (noting
there is no public-policy claim for alleged discrimination by an employer with fewer than
fifteen employees).
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statutes, the legislatively-created protection will likely preclude most,
if not all, common-law causes of action by employees experiencing
intimate violence. In particular, the comprehensive laws in Hawaii,
Illinois, and Oregon provide broad leave rights in terms of the number
of employees covered, the amount of leave provided, and the reasons
for which leave is permitted.174 In addition, Illinois and, effective
January 2010, Oregon law prohibit discrimination against employees
experiencing domestic violence and require employers to reasonably
accommodate their workplace needs.175 All three of these states’ laws
also provide specific relief to employees.176 And while at least Hawaii’s
and Illinois’s common-law exceptions are relatively liberal,177 their
courts defer in interpreting these legislative remedies.178
Oregon law on this point is slightly more complicated. Oregon
recognizes a public-policy exception for terminations for either fulfilling
a societal obligation or pursuing private statutory rights “related to
174. All Hawaiian employers must provide job-protected leave for employees needing
medical treatment, victim services, counseling, time to relocate, or legal assistance. HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-72 (LexisNexis 2010). Employers with fifty or more employees must
provide up to thirty days, while smaller employers must provide up to five. Id. Illinois’s
law, as recently amended, requires employers that have between fifteen and forty-nine
employees to provide up to eight weeks of leave and those with over fifty employees to
provide up to twelve weeks. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/20(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2010).
The leave may be used to seek medical attention or recover from injuries, obtain assistance
from a victim services organization, attend counseling, participate in safety planning, or
seek legal assistance. Id. §§ 180/20(a)(1)(A)-(E). Since 2007, Oregon law has required em-
ployers with six or more employees to provide “reasonable leave” to seek medical or legal
assistance, victim services, or safe housing. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 659A.270, 659A.272
(West 2010).
175. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/30(a) (LexisNexis 2010). Imitating the language
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009), Illinois’s law affirma-
tively requires employers to accommodate qualified employees who have experienced
domestic violence unless such accommodations would “impose an undue hardship on
the . . . employer.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/30(b). Employers are to consider
accommodations such as:
[A]djustment to a job structure, workplace facility, or work requirement,
including a transfer, reassignment, or modified schedule, leave, a changed
telephone number or seating assignment, installation of a lock, or implemen-
tation of a safety procedure, or assistance in documenting domestic or sexual
violence that occurs at the workplace or in work-related settings. . . .
Id. § 180/30(b)(3). Similarly, Oregon law recently added antidiscrimination and reasonable-
accommodation provisions to its employment laws addressing victims of domestic violence.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.290 (West 2010).
176. Both Hawaii and Oregon law provide a civil action to enforce the rights. HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378-72(j) (LexisNexis 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.885 amended by
2010 Or. Laws 1st Sp. Sess. Ch. 102 (S.B. 1045). Illinois’s statute creates an administrative
enforcement procedure. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/35 (LexisNexis 2010).
177. TOBIAS, supra note 128, app. 5A (characterizing Hawaii’s exception as “markedly
liberal” and listing many bases and factual scenarios for application of Illinois’s exception).
178. Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii), 879 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Haw. 1994) (finding a
discrimination claim preempted by statutes that provide a remedy); Dykstra v. Crestwood
Bank, 454 N.E.2d 51, 53-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that administrative remedies
under the Illinois Human Rights Act preclude common law remedies).
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[a plaintiff’s] role as an employe [sic] and . . . of important public
interest,”179 but only when no other statutory remedy is available.180
Employees terminated for seeking judicial relief from abuse or par-
ticipating in criminal proceedings would likely still have a common-
law claim because, as Oregon recognized, it is an “employment related
right of important public interest,” and no other remedy exists.181
Employees who allege that their employment was terminated because
they pursued their statutory rights under Oregon’s workplace legis-
lation (by, for example, seeking a workplace accommodation or a rea-
sonable leave) likely will not have a wrongful discharge claim in
addition to any statutory claim.182 Employees alleging discrimination
on the basis of their experience with domestic violence would likely
only have the statutory claim.183
Connecticut’s workplace legislation does not provide leave, but
it prohibits discharges for obtaining court protection from domestic
violence or for participating in or attending any criminal proceed-
ing.184 The statute also provides a civil action for damages for ag-
grieved employees.185 Thus, as Connecticut’s case law demonstrates,
a wrongful-discharge claim would not succeed in this particular con-
text because it only applies when no other relief is available.186 Based
on the statute’s underlying policy and Connecticut’s unemployment
compensation law, which provides relief to employees who “make rea-
sonable efforts to preserve the employment,”187 Connecticut’s public-
policy exception may be broad enough to protect against terminations
simply based on victim status or for seeking other kinds of non-judicial
assistance, such as counseling or medical care.
4. Victim/Witness Employment Protection
Another category of states that generally recognize the public-
policy exception are those that legislatively protect the employment
179. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Or. 1984) (en banc), super-
seded by statute, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2010)).
180. Id. at 1296 (“Because no other remedy existed for the wrongfully discharged em-
ployee, we allowed the employee to recover compensatory damages in tort.”).
181. Pooley v. Union Cnty., No. 01-343-JE, at *38 (D. Or. Mar. 17, 2003).
182. United States ex rel. Chartraw v. Cascade Healthcare Cmty., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17542, at *12 (D. Or. Mar. 5, 2009) (“[P]laintiff’s wrongful discharge claim based on
retaliation cannot go forward because the statutory remedies under Title VII address the
concerns raised by the Oregon Supreme Court in Holien.”).
183. Cf. Cross v. Eastlund, 796 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no cause of
action for discharge motivated by pregnancy discrimination).
184. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85b(a) (West 2010).
185. Id. § 54-85b(c).
186. Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 182 (Conn. 2000).
187. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-236(a)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2010).
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of crime victims or witnesses. Many states’ statutes provide such pro-
tection to victims or witnesses who participate in a criminal proceed-
ing or otherwise assist in the prosecution.188 Other states’ laws protect
employees subpoenaed or otherwise required to participate in any
judicial proceeding.189
a. Support for a Common-Law Claim
For nine of these states, which also recognize the common-law
claim and have limited other employment-specific statutes, the crime-
victim or witness-protection programs provide the strongest evidence
of legislative support for a state policy against discharging victims of
domestic violence. These states are: Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Utah, and Virginia.
All nine of these states recognize the common-law exception
without significant limitation.190 Arkansas and Utah have explicitly
188. ALA. CODE § 15-23-81 (2010); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017 (West 2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4439 (LexisNexis 2010) (for employers with fifty or more employees);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-303(8) (West
2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85b (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (West
2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.57 (LexisNexis 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-11.1 (West
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23(1) (West 2009) (covering civil and criminal proceedings);
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-102 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. ANN. ch. 268, § 14B
(LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.762, 780.790 (West 2010); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611A.036 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-45 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 595.209(1)(14) (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-205(3) (West 2009); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275:62 (LexisNexis 2010) (twenty-five or more employees); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 215.14 (McKinney 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.18 (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 4957 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-28-13 (West 2009) (fifty or more
employees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550(A) (West 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-4-122
(West 2010) (state employees only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (West 2009); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-40-209 (West 2010).
189. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-3(a) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 621-10.5(a)
(LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.070 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-09.1-17(1) (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-132(1) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-465.1 (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009) (“proceeding pertaining to
a crime”).
190. Arkansas recognizes the common-law exception to the at-will doctrine to protect
employees terminated for exercising statutory rights or performing statutory duties, or
whose discharge violates “some other well established public policy.” Webb v. HCA Health
Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Ark. 1989). Delaware recognized the public-
policy tort more recently, characterizing it as “an important weapon to advance Delaware’s
avowed policy to assure civilized conduct in the workplace.” Schuster v. Derocili, 775 A.2d
1029, 1039 (Del. 2001), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 19 712(b) (2005). See
also Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1150-51 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)
(finding that an employee who refused to violate another’s constitutional right to privacy
was wrongfully discharged); Garavaglia v. Centra, Inc., 536 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) (applying the common-law exception to terminations that violate an employee’s
statutory rights or for an employee’s refusal to violate the law); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision
Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 96 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the common-law exception
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recognized its applicability to terminations of employees who report
or gather evidence regarding crimes.191 Maryland has also recog-
nized a wrongful discharge claim by an employee who was fired for
suing a co-worker for assault and battery, stating that employees have
an “interest in preserving bodily integrity and personality . . . .”192
Delaware first recognized its public-policy exception in the context
of alleged sexual harassment in the workplace, explaining that while
the behavior is a personal assault, it is also “a systemic social problem”
and that “[p]reventing it is of immense social value, and [that] com-
bating it promotes the public policy of this State.”193
What makes these nine states most similar with respect to their
likelihood of recognizing a wrongful discharge claim in the domestic
violence context is their statutory protection for employees who are
crime victims or witnesses who testify at a legal proceeding. Arkansas
and Michigan limit their employment protection to crime victims
attending criminal proceedings.194 Several states’ statutes are writ-
ten more broadly to protect any employee who participates in a crim-
inal proceeding, whether as the victim or a witness, either to protect
the victim’s interest or in response to a subpoena.195 Three states
further broaden the scope of the protection to include employees
applies to terminations that violate policies “reflected by” law); Collins v. Rizkana, 652
N.E.2d 653, 660 (Ohio 1995) (recognizing a “clear public policy to justify an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine”); Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 148 P.3d 945, 948-49 (Utah
2006) (recognizing a common-law exception for exercising workers’ compensation rights);
Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 808-09 (Va. 1996) (empha-
sizing that a statute need not provide a private right to sue for an at-will employee to
pursue a wrongful-discharge claim when the employer violates the statute). Nevada
recognizes a claim “when an employer dismisses an employee in retaliation for the em-
ployee’s doing of acts which are consistent with or supportive of sound public policy and
the common good.” D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 216 (Nev. 1991). The doctrine may
be limited somewhat by a 1995 case that cited Wisconsin law for the proposition that
employees cannot assert simply that they were discharged for actions consistent with
public policy; rather, the employees must show that their employers directed them to vio-
late public policy. Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630, 634 (Nev. 1995). It is unclear whether
this also reflects Nevada law or just Wisconsin law.
191. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385-86 (Ark. 1988); Ryan v. Dan’s
Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 408 (Utah 1998).
192. Watson v. Peoples Security Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 767 (Md. 1991).
193. Schuster v. Derocili, 775 A.2d 1029, 1039 (Del. 2001).
194. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (West 2010) (protecting the employee when atten-
dance is “reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the victim”); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 780.762, 780.790 (West 2010) (criminalizing terminating the employment of crime
victims who testify in response to a subpoena or a prosecutor’s request).
195. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2930.18 (crime
victim), 2945.451 (pursuant to subpoena) (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(14)
(West 2010) (honoring a subpoena to testify at, attend, or participate in the preparation
of a criminal proceeding).
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required to attend any judicial proceeding,196 and Nevada law pro-
tects the employment of any witness who testifies in court.197 While
all of these statutes may imply a correlative right to miss work to
attend such proceedings, several make the employees’ right to take
time off explicit.198
All of these statutes reflect a public policy that is generally sup-
portive of crime victims’ and witnesses’ rights. To effectively enforce
these provisions, the states must recognize a wrongful-discharge claim
because all but the Nevada and Utah statutes fail to provide any civil
statutory relief for the employee.199 Even those states, like Michigan,
that generally view statutory relief as exclusive,200 may recognize
common-law claims because whereas statutes criminalize the em-
ployer’s behavior, they do not provide any statutory relief to the em-
ployee. Although Utah’s statute provides a civil action with available
damages, reinstatement, and attorneys’ fees, it also specifies that
such relief is “in addition to any other remedy . . . .” 201 The statutory
claim is thus cumulative, not exclusive. Nevada’s statute similarly
196. Maryland law prohibits employers from discharging a crime victim for taking time
off to attend a criminal proceeding, MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-102(b) (West 2010),
and from discharging any employee for taking time off in response to a subpoena to attend
any proceeding. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-205(a)(1) (West 2010). Both Utah
and Virginia prohibit employers from discharging employees who attend any judicial pro-
ceeding in response to a subpoena. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-132 (West 2010); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (West 2010).
197. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.070(1) (West 2010).
198. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-205 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209
(1)(14) (West 2010) (prohibiting employers from requiring employees to use vacation time,
personal time, or sick leave to attend proceedings); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (West 2010)
(specifying that an employee need not “use sick leave or vacation time” for necessary time
off). Ohio law clarifies that employers need not pay employees for any time off to attend pro-
ceedings, which is some support for employers being required to allow employees to take
at least unpaid leave. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.18 (West 2010).
199. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (West
2010); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-102 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-205 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.762, 780.790 (West 2010) (crimi-
nalizing employer behavior); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2930.18 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (West 2010) (criminalizing
employer violation).
200. See Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid, Inc., 503 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Mich. 1993) (“Admit-
tedly, a strictly literal interpretation of the statute without an analysis of legislative intent
arguably could lead to an interpretation that would bar discharge of an employee for re-
porting a crime by anyone under any circumstances.”), overruled in part by Brown v. Mayor
of Detroit, 734 N.W.2d 514, 595 n.2 (Mich. 2007). Similarly, under Missouri law, statutory
relief does not preclude a common-law claim unless it “ ‘fully comprehends and envelops the
remedies provided by common law.’ ” Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 95
(Mo. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Dierkes v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mo., 991 S.W.2d 662,
668 (Mo. 1999)).
201. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-132 (West 2010).
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provides civil remedies,202 but Nevada courts may still recognize a
tort claim that provides additional relief to the employee.203
Crimes between intimates or family members are not always
handled in a criminal proceeding, or for that matter in any judicial
proceeding. So to expand the protection to all employees experienc-
ing domestic violence, the courts in these states would have to recog-
nize their statutes as expressing a policy of protecting crime victims
from employment consequences or at least protecting them from
analogous participation in a civil protective order proceeding. To bol-
ster such a claim, most of these states have at least one other statute
that supports a policy of protecting the economic stability of victims
of domestic violence.204 Nearly all of the states’ abuse-prevention acts
explicitly permit courts to restrain offenders from the petitioner’s
place of employment.205 Maryland’s law further specifies that the court
may order that the petitioner be provided use of a shared vehicle if
necessary for continued employment.206 Arkansas, Delaware, and
Missouri laws provide unemployment compensation to those who have
left their employment due to intimate violence.207 Arkansas’s law
also encourages employees to make “reasonable efforts to preserve”
their employment before leaving,208 which provides additional support
for a state policy disfavoring employers simply terminating employ-
ment due to the abuse. Further, Arkansas and Nevada law permit
employers to seek restraining orders on behalf of their employees
who are experiencing violence.209
b. Crime-Victim Protections Preclude Common-Law Claims
The statutory employment-protection of crime victims or wit-
nesses in three other states—Alaska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—
will most likely preclude any common-law discharge claim on these
202. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.070(2) (West 2009).
203. See D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Nev. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff
is entitled to pursue a tort claim where statutory relief is limited to, for example, reinstate-
ment and back wages).
204. For example, Virginia’s only other relevant laws of the type discussed here are its
general abuse prevention statutes. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.1, 279.1 (West 2010).
205. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(2) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW §§ 4-
505(a)(2)(v), 4-506(d)(5) (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(1)(g) (West 2010);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(1)(c) (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g)
(West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106(2)(c) (West 2010).
206. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(10) (West 2010).
207. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513(b)(3)(A) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3314
(West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 288.501(2)(c) (West 2010) (providing compensation either
for quitting due to the violence or if discharged for conduct related to experiencing inti-
mate violence).
208. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513(b) (West 2010).
209. Id. § 11-5-115(a)(3); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.250 (West 2009).
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bases. Specifically, Alaska’s statute prohibits employers from penaliz-
ing crime victims for attending a court proceeding in response to a
subpoena or a prosecutor’s request.210 Wisconsin law prohibits em-
ployers from discharging employees who are “subpoenaed to testify
in an action or proceeding pertaining to a crime.” 211 Pennsylvania
law also prohibits employers from terminating employees who attend
court as crime victims or witnesses.212 All of these statutes explicitly
acknowledge that employees may miss work to attend these proceed-
ings. Whereas the Alaska and Pennsylvania statutes specify that
employers need not compensate employees for the time spent away
from work,213 the Wisconsin statute expressly prohibits employers
from reducing pay for time lost in responding to the subpoena.214 All
of the statutes also provide employees with a civil remedy for em-
ployer violations.215 Based on their deference to legislative remedies,
the courts in these states likely would be reluctant to apply the
common-law exception in this specific context.216
With respect to other domestic-violence related terminations,
although all of these states recognize an exception broad enough to
support a wrongful-discharge claim, they have only limited statutory
support for this specific policy. When defining public policy, Alaska
and Wisconsin courts do not limit it to those activities that “violate
the letter” of a law,217 but rather seek to protect against employer
actions that are contrary to the policy reflected in the statutes.218
Pennsylvania seems to recognize the cause of action, generally,219
but at least the Pennsylvania federal district court has rejected its
210. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017(a) (West 2010).
211. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009).
212. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4957(a) (West 2010).
213. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017(a)(3) (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4957(a)
(West 2010).
214. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009).
215. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017(c) (West 2010) (actual and punitive damages); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4957(c) (West 2010) (lost wages and benefits, and attorneys’ fees);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009) (reinstatement and back pay).
216. Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 127 P.3d 807, 813 n.13 (Alaska 2005)
(expressing reluctance to recognize a wrongful-discharge cause of action when an individual
can pursue a remedy under the Alaska Human Rights Act); Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d
555, 569-70 (Pa. 2009) (rejecting an employee’s wrongful-discharge claim for sexual discrim-
ination by an employer who employed fewer employees than the statutory requirement);
Repetti v. Sysco Corp., 730 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]here the legislature
has created a statutory remedy for a wrongful discharge, that remedy is exclusive.”) (citing
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 842 n.17 (Wis. 1983) (finding that the
legislative remedy is exclusive)).
217. Reust, 127 P.3d at 813.
218. Wandry v. Bull’s Eye Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1986).
219. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. 1978) (holding that
there exists a cause of action where an employee is discharged for performing jury duty).
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application to terminations for being a victim of intimate violence.220
The other statutory support for such claims in these states includes
Alaska’s and Pennsylvania’s laws specifically permitting courts to
restrain offenders from a petitioner’s place of employment221 and
Wisconsin’s unemployment compensation law, which provides
benefits to employees who leave their work because of intimate
violence.222
5. Limited Workplace Legislation
In at least seven states—Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia—while there is nothing
that prevents the courts from adopting a domestic violence public-
policy exception, it is unlikely that they will: these states do not have
any employment-specific statutes related to domestic violence.
All of these states do recognize a public-policy exception to vary-
ing degrees. Relatively speaking, Idaho,223 Nebraska,224 New Jersey,225
Oklahoma,226 and West Virginia’s recognition of the doctrine is some-
what broad,227 whereas Kentucky and Tennessee limit their exceptions
220. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The court did acknowledge
that the exception might apply if an employee were terminated for seeking an order for
protection. Id. at 801. The growing recognition of societal impact of domestic violence in
the last fifteen years may affect the decision’s ongoing viability.
221. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100(c)(4) (West 2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108(a)(6) (West 2010).
222. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(7)(s)(2)(a) (West 2009).
223. Idaho recognizes the exception generally and has specifically acknowledged policies
that favor refusing to commit perjury and complying with jury duty. Crea v. FMC Corp.,
16 P.3d 272, 275 (Idaho 2000) (emphasizing that public policy favors the disclosure and
investigation of criminal activity); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 74 (Idaho
1990) (noting that the exception “protect[s] employees who refuse to commit unlawful acts,
who perform important public obligations, or who exercise certain legal rights or
privileges”).
224. Nebraska’s supreme court recently clarified that its public-policy exception includes
not only specific statutory prohibitions, but also those terminations that effectively circum-
vent the employee’s substantive rights. Wendeln v. Beatrice Manor, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 226,
238-39 (Neb. 2006).
225. In New Jersey, employees can “be secure in knowing that their jobs are safe if they
exercise their rights in accordance with a clear mandate of public policy.” Pierce v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).
226. Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 202 P.3d 144, 149-51 (Okla. 2008) (summariz-
ing various instances in which a claim has been pursued successfully, including when an
employee alleges age discrimination not remedied by state or federal law).
227. West Virginia courts use the same four elements that the Sixth Circuit considers.
Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 723 (W. Va. 2001). The West Virginia Supreme
Court has specifically applied the exception to an employee discharged for giving truthful
testimony, explaining that “the unobstructed search for truth in legal proceedings[ ] is a
high purpose deserving profound respect . . . .” Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480
S.E.2d 817, 826 (W. Va. 1996).
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to those contained in a “ ‘well-established legislative enactment’ ” 228
or “evidenced by an unambiguous statutory provision.” 229
Beyond their general intimate abuse prevention acts,230 however,
these states have limited legislative statements of relevant public
policy. Idaho, New Jersey, and West Virginia’s abuse prevention laws
specifically authorize courts to include the petitioner’s place of employ-
ment in their protective orders.231 New Jersey and West Virginia’s
laws also begin with strong statements of purpose that acknowledge
domestic violence as a significant societal issue that warrants an effec-
tive response.232 Kentucky’s, New Jersey’s, and Oklahoma’s laws pro-
vide some assistance to crime victims who need to miss work to attend
criminal proceedings, but they do not specifically prohibit employers
from terminating the employees’ employment.233 New Jersey’s and
Oklahoma’s unemployment compensation laws provide that employees
cannot be denied benefits if forced to leave work to escape the abuse.234
Nebraska’s law requires employees to make “all reasonable efforts
to preserve the employment” before leaving work to escape abuse.235
This may provide some limited policy support for not terminating
these employees for simply being a victim, or for taking some time
228. Ne. Health Mgmt., Inc. v. Cotton, 56 S.W.3d 440, 446-47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Ky. 1985)).
229. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 898-99 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that statu-
tory remedies are not the exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge of an employee per-
forming jury duty).
230. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-6301-6317 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.715-785
(West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-901-931 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17-26.1
(West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60-60.6 (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-601-
625 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-27-101-1105 (2010).
231. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(1)(i) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:25-29(b)(6)
(West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-503(7) (West 2010).
232. New Jersey’s abuse prevention act recognizes violence between intimates as “a
serious crime against society” and seeks to assure victims that it will provide them with
“maximum protection from abuse . . . .” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2010). West
Virginia’s law states that intimate “violence is a major health and law-enforcement prob-
lem . . . with enormous costs . . . in both dollars and human lives,” and that the law is in-
tended to provide victims with a “speedy remedy to discourage violence . . . .” W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-27-101(a)(3),(b)(2) (West 2010).
233. Crime victims in Kentucky may request assistance from law enforcement and state
attorneys in “informing employers that the need for victim or witness cooperation in the
prosecution of the case may necessitate absence of that victim or witness from work.” KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500(8) (West 2009). New Jersey law requires prosecutors to notify
employers if a crime victim or witness needs to miss work to assist with a prosecution,
but does not mandate that employers do anything specific with that information. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-44(b)(13) (West 2010). Crime victims in Oklahoma have a right to “employer
intercession services” that seek “to minimize the loss of pay and other benefits . . . resulting
from court appearances.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 215.33(8) (West 2010).
234. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(j) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2-210(4)(d)
(West 2010).
235. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-628.01(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010).
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off to seek judicial or other protection from the violence. Tennessee’s
only workplace-specific law is one that permits employers to seek
workplace restraining orders on behalf of their employees.236
B. Limited Recognition of the Public-Policy Exception
Litigants in several other states would face greater obstacles in
asserting a wrongful discharge claim because the states’ recognition
of the public-policy exception is so limited. While those states’ courts
recognize the public-policy exception, they limit it to such a degree
that most discharges related to domestic violence would probably not
qualify. Specifically, six states have recognized the exception only
when an employee is terminated for refusing to violate a law or for re-
porting a violation of law (Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas),237 for
filing a workers’ compensation claim (Wyoming),238 or both (Indiana
and South Dakota).239 North and South Carolina law is similarly con-
strained, as their courts seem to recognize the exception only when
employers violate an express statutory provision or require their em-
ployees to violate the law.240 Colorado’s exception applies only when
employers require employees to violate a law or prohibit employees
from “exercising an important job-related right or privilege . . . .” 241
North Dakota has recognized the exception in only two contexts: re-
taliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim,242 and testifying
pursuant to a subpoena.243 Both of which have now been codified,244
and thus will likely control going forward.245
236. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-14-102 (West 2010).
237. Nelson v. Productive Alts., Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 455-56 (Minn. 2006); McArn v.
Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993); Mott v. Montgomery Cnty., 882
S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (limiting the exception to an employee’s refusal to
violate criminal statutes only).
238. Griess v. Consol. Freightways, Corp., 776 P.2d 752, 754 (Wyo. 1989).
239. Montgomery v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1128 (Ind. 2006);
Tiede v. CorTrust Bank, N.A., 748 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (S.D. 2008).
240. Considine v. Compass Grp. USA, 551 S.E.2d 179, 184 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Lawson
v. S.C. Dept. of Corr., 532 S.E.2d 259, 260-61 (S.C. 2000) (applying the exception when ter-
mination itself violates criminal law, or when employers require employees to do so). The
North Carolina Court of Appeals cites Considine in rejecting a domestic-violence-exception
claim brought by an employee fired after his wife shot him. Imes v. City of Asheville, 594
S.E.2d 397, 398-400 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 606 S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (per curium).
241. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
242. Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 795 (N.D. 1987).
243. Ressler v. Humane Soc’y of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992).
244. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-09.1-17 (West 2009) (prohibiting discharge of employees
who serve as witnesses or jurors in any proceeding); Id. § 34-01-20.
245. Vandall v. Trinity Hosps., 676 N.W.2d 88, 92 (N.D. 2004) (“[S]tatutory enactments
take precedence over and govern conflicting common law doctrines.”).
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The abuse prevention acts in six of these ten states permit the
court to restrain parties from going close to the victims’ workplace.246
Six of these states’ unemployment compensation laws provide benefits
to those who separate from employment to protect themselves from
family violence.247 Three of the states permit employers to seek work-
place restraining orders on behalf of their employees.248 These kinds
of laws, while certainly some evidence of a public policy to assist vic-
tims in maintaining some economic stability, are probably not, even
when combined, adequate to invoke the limited exception these states
recognize for most wrongful discharge claims.249
Employees in Minnesota and North Carolina will likely have
viable claims, however, if their employers discharge them for seek-
ing judicial protection from domestic violence. Since 2004, thus not
in effect for the Imes plaintiff,250 North Carolina has prohibited em-
ployers from discriminating against employees who take “reasonable
time off” to seek court protection,251 and Minnesota has had a nearly
identical law since 2005.252 Because of this explicit statutory language,
246. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(b)(4) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01, subd.
6(9) (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(a)(ii) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50B-3(a)(9)(b) (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(A)(2) (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 85.022(b)(3) (West 2009).
247. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-73-107(1)(g)(II), -108(4)(r)(I) (West 2010); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 22-4-15-1(1)(c)(8), 22-4-15-1(1)(e), 22-4-15-2(e) & 5-26.5-2-2(1)(A)(i) (West 2010);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.095 1(9), 2(10) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 96-14(1)(f)
(West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-13.1(6) (2010); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 207.046(a)(2) (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-311 (West 2010). Minnesota
provides benefits to persons who quit because of domestic abuse and to those who were
“discharged as a result of conduct that was the result of the applicant or [an] immediate
family member being a victim of domestic abuse.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.095 1(9), 2(10)
(West 2009).
248. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(4)(b) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-6-6
(West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-264(b) (West 2010).
249. South Dakota law has the somewhat unique requirement that employees make
every effort to maintain their employment. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-13.1(6)(c) (2010).
Employers should not be permitted to sabotage these efforts by simply terminating em-
ployees’ employment, but South Dakota’s exception does not appear broad enough to
remedy this behavior as it does not technically violate any law. See Tiede v. CorTrust,
748 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (S.D. 2008) (noting that while South Dakota has recognized a
public-policy exception, the court has also stated that a contract action for wrongful dis-
charge may be a more appropriate remedy).
250. Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) aff’d, 606
S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (per curium). See supra Part III.A.4 (summarizing this North
Carolina Court of Appeals decision).
251. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50B-5.5(a), 95-270(a) (West 2010) (including provisions
prohibiting employment discrimination for taking reasonable time off to pursue relief).
252. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 23(a) (civil order for protection); § 609.748, subd.
10(a) (criminal restraining order) (West 2009). Minnesota law also requires employers
to provide all crime victims similar leave to attend or prepare for criminal proceedings.
Id. § 611A.036 subd. 1. It specifically provides a remedy, but characterizes it as
2010] PROTECTING ECONOMIC STABILITY 127
the common-law exceptions in both Minnesota and North Carolina
may very well serve to implement these statutory policies by provid-
ing consequences for employer violations.253
Whether Colorado courts would apply the public-policy exception
to terminations for seeking judicial relief is more complicated. Since
2002, Colorado law has required employers with more than fifty em-
ployees to provide up to three days off to not only seek judicial pro-
tection, but also to seek other assistance, including medical care or
counseling and safety planning.254 This statute would probably con-
trol any claim that an employer terminated someone for seeking this
type of time off, however, because the statute itself provides relief and
Colorado recognizes statutory preclusion of common-law claims.255
Other Colorado laws provide fairly strong evidence of a public
policy of promoting victims’ employment stability that could support
wrongful discharge claims in other scenarios. Colorado’s abuse pre-
vention act recognizes the “paramount importance” of protective orders
because they “promote safety, reduce violence, and prevent serious
harm and death.” 256 The statute also defines domestic violence to in-
clude not only physical abuse or threats of harm, but also other types
of control, including financial, that “make a victim more likely to re-
turn to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic
needs . . . .” 257 Colorado law also authorizes employers to seek work-
place restraining orders258 and provides unemployment compensation
to employees who leave work to protect themselves or a family mem-
ber.259 Perhaps these statutes provide at least enough support of a
public-policy violation for employees terminated for experiencing
domestic violence or seeking court relief, but not taking any time off.
When the violence leads to criminal charges, Colorado employees
as well as those in Indiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina would
likely have a wrongful termination claim if their employers dis-
charged them for missing work to participate in criminal proceed-
ings. Mississippi law requires crime victims to attend and assist in
supplementing “any remedies otherwise provided by law . . . .” Id. § 611A.036 6.
253. The North Carolina law explicitly states that it does not limit the ability of em-
ployees to “pursue any other civil or criminal remedy provided by law.” N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 95-271 (West 2010). Employers who violate Minnesota’s laws may face misdemeanor
charges and will be required to reinstate the employee and pay back wages. MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 518B.01, subd. 23(b), 609.748, subd. 10(b) (West 2009). But nothing in the statute
prohibits additional, common-law relief.
254. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.7(1)(a), (b) (West 2010).
255. See Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co., 759 P.2d 761, 766 (Colo. App. 1988).
256. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(1)(a) (West 2010).
257. Id. § 13-14-102(1)(b)(I).
258. Id. § 13-14-102(4)(b).
259. Id. §§ 8-73-107(1)(g)(II), -108(4)(r)(I).
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the preparation of any criminal proceedings and prohibits employers
from terminating their employment or even threatening to do so for
such activity.260 Colorado, Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming laws
similarly prohibit employers from taking an adverse employment
action against employees who miss work to respond to a subpoena as
a victim or witness.261 Because none of these statutes explicitly pro-
vides relief to employees, courts in Colorado, Indiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina could use their limited exception to fulfill this
clearly stated public policy. Wyoming courts, which have yet to recog-
nize an exception beyond the workers’ compensation arena, would
have to expand its doctrine to do so.
C. No Recognition of the Exception
The final category of states includes those that either have not
applied the public-policy exception or have explicitly rejected it. These
seven states obviously have the least likelihood of recognizing an
exception in the domestic violence context. Neither Georgia nor
Maine have applied the exception, but their supreme courts have
acknowledged the possibility that a future discharge may warrant
its application.262 These two states thus have some, albeit limited, re-
ceptivity to a claim. In Maine, although the courts would not likely
recognize a common-law claim, there would be a good-faith basis in
law for asserting one, at least in certain circumstances.263 Georgia
260. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-45 (West 2009).
261. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-303(8) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-11.1
(West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550(A) (2009); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-40-209(a) (West
2010).
262. See Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 528 S.E.2d 238, 239-40 (Ga. 2000) (acknowl-
edging that a public-policy exception, while disfavored, may be judicially created); Larrabee
v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 100 (Me. 1984) (stating “we do not rule out
the possible recognition of such a cause of action . . . ”).
263. Maine’s statutory recognition of the need to assist employees experiencing domestic
violence is relatively strong. Its abuse definition includes removing someone from the
workplace, and court orders may include enjoining the defendant from the victim’s work-
place. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 4002(1)(D)(1), 4006(5)(D)(2), 4007(1)(C)(2) (2009).
Maine also mandates that all employers provide job-protected leave to employees who have
experienced intimate violence and are seeking legal, medical, or other necessary assistance.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850(1) (2009). The leave statute does not provide a private
right of action, but empowers the Department of Labor to assess civil penalties on em-
ployers who violate the law. Id. § 850(3). Maine’s unemployment compensation laws also
provide benefits to employees who voluntarily separate from their employment for rea-
sons related to the violence and for those who are terminated for “misconduct” if their
actions were necessary to protect themselves or their family members from violence. Id.
§§ 1193(1)(A)(4), 1043(23)(B)(3). In addition to providing some assistance to employees
experiencing domestic violence, these statutes provide a strong statement of Maine’s public
policy of providing some financial stability to victims and discouraging employers from
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employees, on the other hand, would have an extremely weak com-
mon-law claim both because of the court’s legislative deference264 and
the state’s limited statutory statements reflecting support for such
a policy.265 Five other states do not recognize the public-policy
exception to at-will employment: Alabama,266 Florida,267 Louisiana,268
New York,269 and Rhode Island.270 Employees experiencing domestic
violence in these states are not without any statutory rights,271 but
the courts have so far deferred to the legislature for any expansion.272
D. Summary
Courts in at least four states (New Hampshire, Vermont, Califor-
nia, and Kansas) and the District of Columbia would be fairly recep-
tive to a broad, Danny-like policy in favor of supporting employment
stability for victims of domestic violence.273 In these jurisdictions, em-
ployees who could prove that they were terminated because of their
status as domestic violence victims or for taking reasonable time off
unnecessarily interfering with these rights.
264. Reilly, 528 S.E.2d at 240 (“[J]udicially created exceptions are not favored.”).
265. Georgia law prohibits employers from taking any adverse action against employees
who participate in judicial proceedings and provides employees a cause of action against
employers who violate it. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-3(a),(b) (West 2010). Georgia employers
may also seek a workplace restraining order on behalf of their employees. Id. § 34-1-7(b).
266. Wright v. Dothan Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 658 So. 2d 428, 431 (Ala. 1995).
267. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof’l Adm’rs, 427 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983).
268. Tolliver v. Concordia Waterworks Dist. No. 1, 735 So.2d 680, 682 (La. Ct. App.
1999).
269. Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983).
270. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464, 465 (R.I. 1993).
271. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.313(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring limited work-
place leave for domestic violence victims working for large employers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23 (2010) (unemployment benefits) R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-28-13(a) (West 2009)
(mandating leave for crime victims); id. § 28-52-2 (allowing workplace restraining orders).
Employees in New York City have great protection under the city administrative code,
which prohibits workplace discrimination against domestic violence victims and requires
employers to reasonably accommodate their workplace needs. N.Y.C. CODE § 8-107.1(2)
(2009).
272. As the New York court explained,
The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to
discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to
elicit the views of the various segments of the community that would be
directly affected and in any event critically interested, and to investigate
and anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability.
Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89-90; see also Wright v. Dothan Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 
658 So.2d 428, 431 (declining to create a public-policy exception); Pacheco, 623 A.2d at 465
(“It is not the role of the courts to create rights for persons whom the Legislature has not
chosen to protect.”).
273. See supra Part IV.A (predicting the likelihood of states adopting a public-policy
exception).
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to seek judicial or other assistance related to the violence would have
a strong likelihood of success in establishing a public policy.274 Em-
ployees in three more states (Hawaii, Illinois, and Oregon) have sim-
ilar protection from employment decisions based on their experience
of domestic violence, but it is statutorily provided, rather than based
on common law.275
The largest number of states would be most receptive to a claim
by an employee terminated for seeking official, court-related relief
from the violence. Six states (Iowa, Massachusetts,276 New Mexico,
Arizona,277 Minnesota, and North Carolina278) would be receptive to
a common-law claim at least by an employee who turned to either the
civil or criminal systems for assistance. Connecticut and Colorado
protect these same employees statutorily.279 Thirteen other states
(Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia)
would likely recognize a public-policy exception for employees termi-
nated for testifying or otherwise assisting with the criminal prosecu-
tion of their batterers.280 Three states (Alaska, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin) provide this relief statutorily.281
V. THE COURTS’ ROLE IN EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
A. Common-Law Remedy Alone Is Insufficient
As others have argued, and further supported by this analysis,
use of the common-law exception to at-will employment is a limited
and imperfect solution to the problems that employers and employees
274. This article’s analysis is limited to the public-policy element. However, employees
may face other obstacles in pursuing a wrongful discharge claim. For example, the em-
ployer in Danny could have prevailed at trial if it established that the employee was, in
fact, terminated for falsifying payroll records, that her time off to address the domestic
violence was not necessary to protect her or her children, or that it had some other over-
riding justification for the termination. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d
128, 139 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
275. See supra Part IV.A.3.c (explaining these three states’ protections).
276. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the two states’ potential receptivity to a common-
law claim).
277. See supra Part IV.A.3.b. (noting Arizona’s recognition would only apply to em-
ployers with fifty or more employees, however, as statutorily defined).
278. See supra Part IV.B (explaining these states’ limited recognition of the exception).
279. See supra Parts IV.A.3.c, IV.B (describing statutory protections).
280. See supra Parts IV.A.4.a,  IV.B (discussing these states’ potential receptivity to
a public-policy exception).
281. See supra Part IV.B (describing these states’ statutory relief).
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face when domestic violence impacts the workplace.282 Because of
varying state approaches to the doctrine and legislative statements
of public policy, employees in more than half of the states are not like-
ly to receive any common-law relief for terminations related to their
experiences of domestic violence. In those states in which the courts
may be receptive to a wrongful discharge claim, employees cannot yet
rely on any concrete protections, and litigation would likely be expen-
sive and unpredictable. Even in Washington, where the exception
to at-will employment has been recognized, the application is unde-
veloped and may remain so because Washington employees can now
turn to clearer, legislative protections.
Development of the common-law doctrine could also lead to bad,
or at least imperfect, policy. It is most likely that courts would be will-
ing to recognize a policy interest when employees are terminated for
seeking judicial relief from violence because of the statutory support
for this policy in many states and because the policy exception would
be more consistent with other exceptions that states already recog-
nize. While civil protective orders are effective mechanisms in many
domestic violence situations, seeking such relief may actually trigger
more severe violence or risk of harm to some individuals and their
children and should not be the only basis upon which employees can
protect their jobs.283 Relying solely on crime-victim statutes for pro-
tection of employment is problematic for similar reasons and because
not all domestic violence fits within the incident-based definitions
under which our criminal justice system is organized.284 Moreover,
some victims who could seek refuge from law enforcement and crim-
inal prosecution choose not to for many reasons, including previous
bad experiences with law enforcement and fear of increased violence
if arrest and prosecution ultimately fails.285
For these reasons and more, it may be preferable for all states
to adopt comprehensive workplace protections or for Congress to
address this issue.286 Progress is ongoing, as several states have now
282. For example, Professor Tarr reviewed Park’s work and concluded that the “remedy
is not reliable enough or inclusive enough to ensure the economic security of domestic
violence victims,” and that, even if it were effective, it does not require employers to accom-
modate employees or address discrimination short of termination. Tarr, supra note 40,
at 402.
283. See id., at 388-89 (explaining the problem of courts and legislatures essentially
requiring an order for protection as a baseline for other remedies or assistance).
284. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call
to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 971-74 (2004).
285. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning
the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7,
16 (2004).
286. See Goldscheid, supra note 16, at 118-19 (proposing application of Title VII to
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enacted such legislation and many continue to advocate for federal
legislation, but the work is slow-going and imperfect as well. To date,
the overwhelming majority of states do not provide adequate statu-
tory protections for employees experiencing domestic violence,287 and
federal legislation, though introduced each session since 2001, has
yet to pass.288 Legislative change presents its own challenges, and
is further complicated by competing interests. As Professor Cottone
explained in the context of discussing modifications to the at-will
employment doctrine more generally, it is difficult to organize the
range of workers who need the protection (from low paid, hourly work-
ers to managers and executives), and even effective organization will
likely face strong and well-funded opposition.289 In his view, any
resulting legislation would be full of compromise which would
“probably drain any potency of the proposed statute.” 290
B. Common-Law Remedy Is Essential to Effective Reform
Common-law recognition of a public-policy exception for termi-
nations related to domestic violence thus provides an appropriate and
necessary complement to the ongoing legislative reform. It is entirely
fitting for courts to further develop this common-law doctrine. As the
Eighth Circuit has explained:
[T]he Legislature is not the only source of [public] policy. In
common-law jurisdictions the courts too have been sources of law,
always subject to legislative correction, and with progressively
less freedom as legislation occupies a given field. It is the courts,
to give one example, that originated the whole doctrine that certain
kinds of businesses—common carriers and innkeepers—must serve
the public without discrimination or preference. In this sense,
then, courts make law, and they have done so for centuries.291
workplace domestic violence issues); Karin, supra note 16, at 379 (urging federal law); 
Widiss, supra note 10, at 718 (advocating for state legislative reform).
287. See supra Part I.B (discussing the inadequacy of existing protections).
288. Proposed in 2001, the Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act would have re-
quired employers to reasonably accommodate employees experiencing domestic violence.
Brown, supra note 40, at 16; Karin, supra note 16, at 397-99 (discussing the Survivors’
Empowerment and Economic Security Act, and the Security and Financial Empowerment
Act, introduced in 2007).
289. Edwin Robert Cottone, Employee Protection from Unjust Discharge: A Proposal
for Judicial Reversal of the Terminable-At-Will Doctrine, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1260,
1279 (2002).
290. Id.
291. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984); see also, Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1838 (1980) (“Courts themselves created the at will
rule; it is therefore entirely appropriate that they now take the lead in modifying it.”).
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Courts have both the power and the expertise to provide a common-
law remedy when confronted with the appropriate case.292 The
Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Danny makes it even more
likely that other states might recognize the public-policy exception
in this context, as courts often look to other jurisdictions for support
in developing this doctrine.293
In over half of the states identified as receptive to a wrongful
discharge claim in this context, recognition of the doctrine is not only
appropriate, but also necessary to implement the clear statutory poli-
cies that otherwise fail to provide employees with a cause of action.294
The courts’ recognition, even if limited to those employees who seek
judicial relief or assist in criminal prosecutions, will also begin to pro-
vide clarity to this cause of action and may lead to further develop-
ment of the exception in the domestic violence context. For example,
if courts are willing to recognize that employees who seek orders for
protection should have some employment protection, the logical ex-
tension of such a policy would be to prevent employers from status-
based terminations. In other words, employers should not be able to
circumvent the policy of encouraging employees to seek protective
orders by firing them as soon as the employer learns or suspects that
an employee is experiencing domestic violence. Similarly, in states
like Connecticut, where employees have statutory protection from
terminations for seeking judicial relief,295 the courts could recognize
a wrongful discharge claim in the context of an employee seeking
relief for seeking reasonable time off to seek non-judicial assistance,
such as safe housing or medical attention.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, judicial recognition of this
cause of action may actually support and inspire additional domestic
violence workplace legislation. Many of the now-established public-
policy exceptions have evolved into statutory protections. For example,
after the Oregon Supreme Court recognized an exception to at-will
292. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing
“the capacity of the common law to develop and adapt to current needs” (citing Jersey
Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1009 (1980))); Nees v. Hocks, 536
P.2d 512, 514 (Or. 1975) (“This court has not felt unduly restricted by the boundaries of
pre-existing common-law remedies. We have not hesitated to create or recognize new torts
when confronted with conduct causing injuries which we feel should be compensable.”).
293. See, e.g.,; Pierce, 417 A.2d at 509-10; Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 657
(Ohio 1995); Nees, 536 P.2d at 515 (discussing the emerging trend of the exception in
other jurisdictions).
294. As noted in the above discussion, many state laws prohibit employer behavior,
but do not specify the employee’s remedy. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132 (West 2009)
(mandating employers to allow leave, but not specifying consequences for failure to do
so); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (West 2009) (prohibiting terminations for honoring
subpoenas).
295. See supra Part I.A.3.c (noting Connecticut’s statutory protections).
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employment for an employee terminated for serving on a jury,296 its
legislature codified the rule, and many jurisdictions later followed.297
The whistle-blower exception, which protects employees who disclose
their employers’ illegal activities, similarly began as a common-law
doctrine,298 and now many state and federal statutes have codified
the protection.299 So while more comprehensive and predictable legis-
lation may be the ultimate goal to address the impact that domestic
violence has on victims’ financial stability, the courts could play an
important role in the evolution of such legislation.
CONCLUSION
Over the last thirty years, state and federal laws have evolved
to address domestic violence on several fronts. State laws, particu-
larly those that recognize the impact that domestic violence has in
the workplace, reflect a growing consensus that domestic violence
warrants a multi-faceted public response. Reviewing its own domestic
violence laws, the Washington Supreme Court declared that its state
has “a clear mandate of public policy of protecting domestic violence
survivors and their families and holding [their] abusers account-
able.” 300 In light of this precedent and the many state laws that
reflect a similar policy, particularly the emerging workplace legisla-
tion, many other states may be poised to recognize a public-policy
exception to at-will employment for terminations related to domestic
violence. Development of this common-law claim could play a criti-
cal role in influencing individual employers’ responses to their employ-
ees, as well as in developing more comprehensive and predictable
workplace legislation.
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297.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(a) (West 2003); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney 2003); 
Swift, supra note 41, at 559 nn. 42 & 43 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 10.090(1) (2003); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001-003 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008)).
298. Id. at 561-64 (citing Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Co., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987)).
299. Id. at 564-65 & nn. 68-75.
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